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"ORIGIN OF GOODS": DELVING INTO
DASTAR CORP. V. TWENTIETH CENTURY
FOX FILM CORP.
DENINE C. PAGANO*
I. INTRODUCTION
Enacted in 1946, the Lanham Act,1 the "foundation of United
States trademark law,"2 has the purpose of promoting registra-
tion of trademarks, 3 creating a cause of action for the "deceptive
and misleading use of marks" in commerce, 4 and (in protecting
people engaged in commerce) thwarting consumer confusion and
* Graduated magna cum laude from the College of the Holy Cross with a B.A. in Eng-
lish, and was selected as a member of the Phi Beta Kappa Honor Society. The author
would like to thank the Journal of Legal Commentary for the publication of this piece,
and would also like to thank her family and 'Caddie', without whose love, support, and
guidance, law school and this paper would not have been possible.
1 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2004) (encouraging registration of trademarks and other marks).
See Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 687 (2d Cir. 1971) (defin-
ing Lanham Act); see also Stauffer v. Exley, 184 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1950) (explaining
further meaning of Lanham Act).
2 Sam Mamudi, Supreme Court Sets Trade Mark Boundaries, EUROMONEY INST'L
INVESTOR MANAGING INTELL. PROP., July 1, 2003, at 14 (discussing Supreme Court ruling
that diminished ability of holders to use trade mark law to counter copyright infringe-
ment).
3 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2004) (defining trademark as "word, name, symbol, or device, or
any combination thereof... (1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide in-
tention to use in commerce... to identify and distinguish... goods, including a unique prod-
uct, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the
goods");DONALD E. BIEDERMAN & SILFEN ET AL., LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE
ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRIES 257 (CT, Praeger 2001) (defining trademark as "a sign, de-
vice, or mark by which the goods produced or dealt in by a particular individual or busi-
ness are distinguished from those produced or dealt in by others"); see also Aluminum
Fabricating Co. v. Season-All Window Corp., 259 F.2d 314, 317 (2d Cir. 1958) (stating
that registration is prima facie evidence of validity).
4 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2004) (stating that intent of the statute "is to regulate commerce
within the control of Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of
marks in such commerce; ... to protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair
competition; to prevent fraud and deception... by the use of reproductions.. .of registered
marks"); see also Marriott Corp. v. Ramada, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 726, 727 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(explaining that Lanham Act addresses itself to false or misleading designations); Tri-
pledge Products, Inc. v. Whitney Resources, LTD., 735 F. Supp. 1154, 1160 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (stating that Lanham Act gives statutory remedy for trademark infringement and
unfair competition to party injured by false designation of origin of its product).
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destruction of producer goodwill. 5 This trademark statute, having
common law foundations, tackles most forms of advertising and
promotion 6 and is aimed at identifying the producer of the goods
that are offered for sale. 7 In particular, Congress enacted §43(a)
of the Lanham Act 8 to codify the common law trademark doctrine
of 'passing off,' which is the representation of one person's goods
or works as those of another.9 Specifically, §43(a)1° creates a fed-
5 See Virgin Enters v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing that cause of
action will arise if significant number of consumers are confused by infringing mark);
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1037 (2d Cir. 1992) (stat-
ing that main question is whether marking will contribute to consumer confusion); see
also Howard J. Susser, Supreme Court: Federal Lanham Act No Help to Owners of Ex-
pired Copyrights, INTELL. PROP. LITIG. REP., July 22, 2003, at 13 (discussing unfair com-
petition functions of Lanham Act).
6 See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 222 F.3d 1262, 1270 (10th Cir. 2000) (discussing
that there is cause of action against anybody who uses misleading misrepresentation of
fact in commerce, which in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents nature of
another person's goods or services), affd, 317 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Gillette
Co. v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc., 795 F. Supp. 662, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (explaining that ad-
vertising agencies can also be liable under Lanham Act if they knowingly participate in
false advertising); Harold P. Weinberger & Jonathan M. Wagner, A Lanham Act False
Advertising Suit is the Weapon of Choice, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Oct. 2003, at 00
(clarifying that Lanham Act reaches national and local advertising, and other modes, such
as product labeling, letters, and oral exchanges by sales representatives).
7 See Wal-Mart Stores Inc., v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000) (stating that
trademark is any symbol, word, name, or device used to distinguish producer's goods from
others on the market); see also Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d
137,144 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that Lanham Act is used to enable consumers to be
able to distinguish between consumers goods); Laura Gasaway, Origin of Goods in Trade-
mark Law Does Not Mean Creator; Copyright Corner, SPECIAL LIBR. ASS'N INFO.
OUTLOOK, Nov. 1, 2003, at 7 (noting that common law foundations were not designed to
protect originality or creativity).
8 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2004) (explaining that §43 of Lanham Act was intended not only
to prevent false designations as to origin, but to protect consumers against all forms of
misrepresentation of products). See Pgc Property., L.L.C. v. Wainscott/Sagaponack Prop-
erty Owners, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 2d 136, 140 (E.D.N.Y 2003) (stating that §43 of Lanham
Act protects those parties who are in connection with goods and services); see also Pep-
siCo, Inc., v. Dunlap Tire & Rubber Corp., 578 F. Supp. 196, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (explain-
ing that purpose of §43 was to address claims of deception and misrepresentation consti-
tuting trademark infringement and unfair competition).
9 See Larkin Group, Inc., v. Aquatic Design Consultants, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1121,
1121 (D.Kan. 2004) (explaining that passing off is when someone tries to claim another
person's goods as his or her own); see also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution Right
in the United States; Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright and Section 43(A), 77
WASH. L. REV. 985, 1003 (2002) (noting how, traditionally, passing off was crucial for au-
thenticating common law unfair competition); Lori H. Freedman, Reverse Passing Off: A
Great Deal of Confusion, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 307 (1993) (discussing congressional
intent underlying §43(a)).
10 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2004) (stating that there is civil action when, "[any person
who... uses in commerce any word..., or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which (A) is likely to
cause confusion... of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval... by another person"). See generally Freedman, supra note 9, at 307 (explaining
congressional intent behind §43(a)).
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eral remedy against those who use, in commerce, false designa-
tions of origin.1
Clearly, the Lanham Act protects both producers and consum-
ers, yet, recently, some courts have broadened the Act "to protect
original creators on the grounds that consumers deserve to know
the 'origin of goods." ' 12 Such court interpretation inevitably led to
the creation of the idea that the Lanham Act could function as
"the one federal enactment capable of safeguarding the right of
attribution."'13 Are original creators entitled to such actions for
credit under §43(a)'s language of "origin," or were the courts go-
ing too far?
In Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,14 the Su-
preme Court levels their answer: the courts were stretching the
Lanham Act in their protection of original creators. Through
clear definition of the §43(a) phrase "origin of goods," Dastar
holds there is no such right to 'proper credit' for an original crea-
tor with an expired copyright under §43(a) of the Lanham Act.' 5
11 See Stuart G. Richeson, Unattributed Copying of Work No Longer Protected by Copy-
right, 51 LA. B.J. 218, 218-19 (2003) (discussing purpose of §43 of Lanham Act); see also
Lynn McLain, Thoughts on Dastar from a Copyright Perspective: A Welcome Step Toward
Respite for the Public Domain, 26 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 71, 72 (2002/2003) (clarify-
ing that §43(a) of Lanham Act prohibits false or misleading designations or representa-
tions regarding origin of goods); Kurt M. Saunders, A Crusade in the Public Domain: The
Dastar Decision, 30 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 161, 166 (2004) (quoting §43(a) of
Lanham Act which states that "false designation [s] of origin" are prohibited).
12 David G. Savage, Justices Fine-Tune Coverage of Trademark Act; Films and Other
Works in the Public Domain Can Be Copied and Revised For Sale Without Crediting the
Original Creators, High Court Says, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 2003, at 18 (emphasis added)
(commenting on protectiveness of federal judges in California and New York concerning
authors, composers, and producers). See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim
Authorship in U.S. Copyright and Trademarks Law, 41 Hous. L. REV. 263, 265 (2004)
(describing how Lanham Act had been read by many as particularly affording authors
relief against misattributions of authorship); McLain, supra note 11, at 81 (highlighting
that several lower courts have interpreted §43(a) of Lanham Act as providing "duplicate
remedy for copyright infringement").
13 Rosenthal Kwall, supra note 9, at 988. See generally Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc.,
71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995) (defining right of attribution as "the right of an artist to be
recognized by name as the author of his work or to publish anonymously or pseudony-
mously, the right to prevent the author's work from being attributed to someone else, and
to prevent the use of the author's name on works created by others"); Kurt Vander Voort,
Tempest in a Test Tube: Science and Plagiarism, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1569, 1587 (1994)
(noting recognition that artists suffer noneconomic injury when their names are not at-
tached to their works).
14 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
15 See Savage, supra note 12, at 18 (noting difference between copyrights and trade-
marks). See generally Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Rules in Dispute Over Copyrights,
USA TODAY, June 3, 2003, at 4a (stating that Dastar held that unaccredited copying of
work after copyright had expired was not prevented by U.S. trademark law); Linda
Greenhouse, Court Rules Out Using Trademark Law in Case About Old War Footage,
N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2003, at 26 (highlighting how decision was eagerly anticipated in in-
tellectual property circles because of "intersection of copyright and trademark law").
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Is the Court's reasoning correct? What are the implications for
creators, for the public domain, for the right to attribution in
America? What is Dastar's legacy?
II. DASTAR CORP. V. TWENTIETH CENTURY Fox FILM CORP.
A. The Facts of Dastar
In 1948, General Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote Crusade in
Europe, his personal memoirs of the European allied Campaign
during the Second World War.16 Doubleday published Crusade in
Europe, and also granted exclusive television rights to an affiliate
of Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation (Fox).17 Fox then ap-
proved for Time, Inc., to produce a television series18 based on Ei-
senhower's book, of the same name. 19 Time, Inc. thus assigned its
copyright in the series to Fox.20 In 1975, Doubleday renewed the
copyright on the book; Fox, however, did not renew the copyright
16 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 25 (specifying that Eisenhower completed Crusade in Europe
three years after German surrender at Reims); see also Tyler T. Ochoa, Amicus Brief In-
troduction: Rights of Attribution, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, and the Copyright Pub-
lic Domain, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 911, 913 (2004) (noting that Crusade in Europe de-
scribes Eisenhower's personal experiences in World War II); Saunders, supra note 11, at
163-64 (highlighting how Crusade in Europe was Eisenhower's first hand account of Al-
lied Campaign in Europe during Second World War).
17 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 25 (noting how Doubleday also registered this book with
Copyright Office in 1948); see also Ochoa, supra note 16, at 913 (emphasizing that Eisen-
hower assigned "all" of his rights pertaining to Crusade in Europe to Doubleday); Saun-
ders, supra note 11, at 163 (reiterating sequence of events between Eisenhower, Double-
day and Fox).
18 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 26 (describing television series as twenty-six episodes, first
broadcast in 1949, and commenting that television series, blended soundtrack based on
"narration of the book with film footage from the United States Army, Navy, and Coast
Guard, the British Ministry of Information and War Office, the National Film board of
Canada, and unidentified 'Newsreel Pool Cameramen"'); see also Laurence P. Colton and
Nigamnarayan Acharya, Intellectual Property, 55 MERCER L. REV. 1327, 1348 (2004) (not-
ing that Time, Inc. obtained copyright registration on television series). See generally
Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 271 (commenting on how Fox's contribution to production of
television series was "more formal than real" because Time, Inc. was principle creator).
19 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 539 U.S. 25-26 (2003) (noting
name of television series was "Crusade in Europe"); see also Peter A. Craft & Michael G.
Sheppard, How Will Recent Court Decisions Impact Your Practice? Find Out Here, in Part
2, Civil Cases, 39 TENN. B. J. 12, 36 (2003) (clarifying that Fox "arranged" for Time to
produce television series); Ochoa, supra note 16, at 915 (specifying that Fox commissioned
'March of Time" film unit of Time, Inc. to produce "Crusade in Europe").
20 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 25-27 (stating facts of case); see also Ochoa, supra note 16, at
915 (noting how Fox registered copyright listing Time, Inc. as author after assignment);
Saunders, supra note 11, at 163 (reemphasizing how Time, Inc. assigned its copyright in
television series to Fox).
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on the Crusade in Europe television series. 21 The result of Fox's
failure to renew its copyright in the series is crucial in the Su-
preme Court's mind: Fox's actions left the television series in the
public domain. 22 In 1988, Fox reacquired the television rights in
Eisenhower's book, including the exclusive right to distribute the
series on video. 23 Thus, Fox gave SFM Entertainment ("SFM")
and New Line Home Video, Inc., ("New Line") the exclusive
rights to distribute the original television series.24 SFM and New
Line restored the episodes and repackaged the entire series on
videotape; New Line then distributed the videotapes. 25
Dastar Corp. purchased eight beta cam tapes of the original
version of Fox's Crusade television series, which, as the Supreme
Court notes, is in the public domain. 26 Dastar copied these tapes,
21 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 26 (describing Doubleday's status as "proprietor of copyright
in a work made for hire"); see also Brandy A. Karl, Reverse Passing Off and Database Pro-
tections: Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 9 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L.
481, 484 (2003) (reiterating that Doubleday submitted renewal for copyright on Eisen-
hower's book as work for hire); Ochoa, supra note 16, at 916 (suggesting that if book was
work made for hire, renewal copyright of Doubleday would be valid, and copying any por-
tions of television series based on book would be infringement).
22 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 26 (affirming that Fox's copyright on the series expired in
1977); see also Lanham Act Cannot Prevent Unaccredited Copying of Uncopyrighted Work,
COMPUTER LAWYER, (The Computer & Internet Lawyer, Aspen Publishing), Aug, 2003, at
27 [herinafter Unaccredited (stating once copyright has expired, copyright law gives pub-
lic right to copy without attribution); Gasaway, supra note 7, at 7 (affirming right to copy,
without credit, once work passes into public domain after copyright expiration).
23 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 26 (stating that Fox also reacquired exclusive right to sub-
license others to distribute Crusade in Europe television series on video); see also Jessica
Bohrer, Strengthening the Distinction between Copyright and Trademark: The Supreme
Court Takes a Stand, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 23 (2003) (stating that Fox reacquired
television rights in book, including exclusive right to sub-license distrubution capability to
others); Stacey L. Garrett, No Need to Search the Nile: The Supreme Court Clarifies the
Use of Public Domain Works in Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH.
& POL'Y 573, 575 (2003) (noting that these exclusive rights were purchased by Fox).
24 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 539 U.S. 23, 26 (2003) (noting
that distribution would be done on video); see also Ochoa, supra note 16, at 917 (stating
that SFM reproduced series in package of six videocassettes for sale to consumers);
Garrett, supra note 23, at 575 (explaining SFM Entertainment and New Line Home Video
Inc.'s right to distribute videotape was put to contract).
25 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 26 (noting that SFM restored negatives which it obtained); see
also William G. Barber, Recent Developments in Trademark Law: Reverse Domain Name
Hijacking, Mutant Copyrights, and Other Mysterious Creatures of the Trademark World,
12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 361, 364 (2004) (noting that Fox authorized SFM to restore TV
series); Ochoa, supra note 16, at 916-17 (explaining that in 1980, SFM originally pur-
chased from Time-Life Films, Inc., March of Time film library, which included original
negatives of Crusade in Europe series, but could not distribute television series without
clearing rights with Doubleday).
26 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 26 (noting in 1995, Dastar decided to expand its product line
from music compact discs to videos); see also Richard Ronald, Note: Dastar Corp. v.
Twenteth Century Fox Film Corp., 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 243, 250 (2004) (noting that
Dastar did not purchase repackaged tapes sold by New Line); Andrew Jones et al.,
Trademark versus Copyright Protection - Whether an uncredited motion picture partici-
pant may recover under the Lanham Act, 5 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 191, 201 (2003)
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and then edited the Crusade in Europe TV series.27 Dastar re-
leased a video set entitled World War II Campaigns in Europe.
28
How did Dastar alter Fox's work? Dastar "substituted a new
opening sequence, credit page, and final closing for those of the
Crusade television series; inserted new chapter-title sequences
and narrated chapter introductions; moved the 'recap' in the
Crusade television series to the beginning and retitled it as a
'preview'; and removed references to and images of the book."29
Dastar also created new packaging, then manufactured and sold
the Campaigns video set as its own product.30 Dastar's advertis-
ing31 and videos themselves make no reference to Fox, Fox's Cru-
sade television series, Eisenhower's book, or New Line's video-
tapes. 32 In addition, Dastar's Campaigns screen credits lists
employees of Dastar as the series' executive producer, producer,
and associate producer. 33
(suggesting that Dastar bought series in deliberate effort to compete with Fox, SFM, and
New Line).
27 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 26 (noting that Dastar's series is slightly more than half as
long as original Crusade in Europe television series); see Karl, supra note 21, at 484 (not-
ing that campaigns were approximately half as long as Crusade, but contained approxi-
mately half-hour of original footage); see also Garrett, supra note 23, at 575 (suggesting
that other than altering opening and closing sequences, content of videos was essentially
the same).
28 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 26 (maintaining that Dastar's reasoning was anticipated re-
newed interest in World War II on 50th anniversary of war's end); see also Ochoa, supra
note 16, at 917 (noting that Dastar employee produced the derivative work based on
original television series); Saunders, supra note 11, at 164 (noting that Campaigns videos
made no reference to the Crusade television series, New Line's Crusade videotapes, or
book).
29 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 539 U.S. 23, 26-27 (2003) (describ-
ing Dastar's modifications to Fox's original television series, Crusade, and noting that, as
a result, Dastar's Campaigns series is slightly more than half as long as the Crusade tele-
vision series).
30 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 27 (asserting that Dastar sells its Campaigns videos to Sam's
Club, Costco, Best Buy, and other retailers and mail-order companies for $25 per set,
which is less than cost of New Line's Crusade videotapes); see also Saunders, supra note
11, at 164 (noting that videos proved to be one of Dastar's biggest selling products); Deb-
orah Nathan, Supreme Court Will Hear Dispute Under Lanham Act, ENT. LIT. REP.,
March 31, 2003 (stating that Dastar's profits were approximately $784,000).
31 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 27 (describing Dastar's advertising as "Produced and Distrib-
uted by: Entertainment Distributing"); see also McLain, supra note 11, at 87 (stating that
Dastar manufacturered and sold Campaigns as its own product); Saunders, supra note
11, at 164 (noting that Dastar's advertising did not reference Crusade television series).
32 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 27 (adding that executive producer, producer, and associate
producer listed on videos were employees of Dastar); see also Karl, supra note 21, at 484
(stating that Dastar removed any references to original television series); Ronald, supra
note 26, at 250 (explaining that Dastar packaged Campaigns video series, which was half
as long as original Crusade series).
33 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 27 (showing how Dastar's credits state, "DASTAR CORP pre-
sents" and "an ENTERTAINMENT DISTRIBUTING Production," with no mention to
Crusade); see also Bohrer, supra note 23, at 23 (stating that Campaigns series makes no
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B. Respondents' Claims
In 1998, Fox, SFM, and New Line (collectively, 'Fox') sued, al-
leging that Dastar's sale of its Campaigns videos infringes Dou-
bleday's copyright in Eisenhower's book, and inherently, the ex-
clusive TV rights in that book. 34 Fox later amended the
complaint, adding claims that Dastar's sale of the Campaigns in
Europe videos without proper credit to the Crusade in Europe se-
ries constituted "reverse passing off," in violation of §43(a) of the
Lanham Act,35 as well as in violation of state unfair competition
law. 36 Fox felt "any person reading the packaging or credits and
viewing [Dastar's] tapes would believe that only Dastar was re-
sponsible for their creation."37
C. "Reverse Passing Off"
Codified in §43(a), 'passing off is defined as "when a producer
misrepresents his or her own goods or services as those of an-
other producer." 38 Over time, courts began to broaden the range
mention of Crusades series); Matthew Ian Goforth, Casenote: Trademark Law - The
Lanham Act - Federal Trademark Law Does Not Protect the Ideas or Communications
Embodied in a Communicative Product, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 335, 345 at n.10 (2003/2004)
(referring to fact that Darstar listed itself as producer and distributor of Campaigns).
34 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 539 U.S. 23, 26-27 (2003) (ex-
plaining that Campaigns only differs from Crusade in opening sequence, credit page, and
final closing); see also Jonathan D. Reichman & Amy G. Feinsilver, Origin of Goods Under
the Lanham Act, THE INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST, July 11, 2003 at I (noting that Fox
brought action alleging that Dastar's video series infringed copyright in Doubleday book);
Supreme Court Expands Rights of Copyright Holders, DELAWARE LAW WEEKLY, June 11,
2003 at D5 [herinafter Copyright Holders] (stating that SFM and New Line sued in 1998,
alleging that Dastar's video failed to provide appropriate credit to the original television
series).
35 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2004) (stating, in relevant part, claim of "false designation of ori-
gin, false or misleading designation of fact, or false or misleading representation of
fact.. .likely to cause confusion" as to origin of goods). See Ochoa, supra note 16, at 922
(characterizing passing off as when one person ['defendant] 'passing off its goods as those
of another person ['plaintiff], "by using the plaintiffs mark on goods manufactured by the
defendant"); see also Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. 691 F.2d 168, 172 (1982) (explain-
ing that false designations of origin in form of "reverse palming off' are in violation of
Lanham Act.).
36 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 27-28 (noting that upon cross-motions for summary judg-
ment, District Court found for Fox on all three counts); see also Reichman, supra note 34,
at 1 (stating that "reverse passing off' is in violation of state unfair competition law);
Janet Fries & Michael J. Remington, Who Remembers the Names? Author's rights in flux
after Dastar ruling, LEGAL TIMES, July 21, 2003, at 30 (explaining that Court granted
Fox's motion for summary judgment).
31 James B. Astrachan, Supreme Court's Decision on Copyrights Morally Wrong, DAILY
RECORD (Baltimore, MD), July 11, 2003, at 1.
38 Gasaway, supra note 7, at 21. See 15 U.S.C. §1125(a) (2004) (defining palming off as
when manufacturer tries to 'pass off his goods by tagging them with another's trade-
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of unfair competition law by including the opposite notion of 're-
verse passing off,'3 9 which is when one entity misrepresents an-
other's goods as their own. 40 Fox claimed Dastar engaged in such
reverse passing off, and thus was guilty of false designation of
origin under §43(a) of the Lanham Act,41 "because [Dastar] had
copied, edited, and added to Crusade and re-released it as World
War II Campaigns in Europe, without attributing original mate-
rial to Fox."42
D. Procedural History
The United States District Court found for Fox, New Line, and
SFM on all three counts: copyright infringement, reverse passing
off in violation of the Lanham Act, and unfair competition.43 For
the state unfair competition claim, the court "treated its resolu-
tion of the Lanham Act claim as controlling 44 because it felt that
the decisive test under both claims was the likelihood of public
confusion or deception. 45 Dastar appealed, and the Court of Ap-
mark); see also Dastar, 539 U.S. at 28 n.1 (defining passing off [or palming off] as when
someone misrepresents his own goods or services as those of someone else).
9 Ochoa, supra note 16, at 922 (classifying reverse passing off as using defendant's
mark on goods manufactured by plaintiff). See Freedman, supra note 9, at 305 (discussing
reverse passing off in relation to passing off); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION 5 (1995) (stating reverse passing off occurs when one marks another's good
with his own trademark).
40 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 539 U.S. 23, 28 n.1 (2003) (de-
scribing reverse passing off); see also Gasaway, supra note 7, at 21 (defining reverse palm-
ing off as when "the producer misrepresents someone else's goods or services as his or her
own"); Jeanne Hamburg, 'Bodily Appropriation' of a Creative Work, N.Y.L.J., March 19,
2003, at 4 (explaining that reverse passing off takes place when "junior user.. falsely
identifies itself as the originator or source of the senior user's goods).
41 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 30 (observing all Circuits that deliberated issue found § 43(a)
"broad enough to encompass reverse passing off'); Gasaway, supra note 7, at 21 (elucidat-
ing how Fox claimed Dastar was guilty of false designation of origin because Dastar was
not original creator of content of videotapes); Mamudi, supra note 2, at 14 (noting that
Fox claimed Dastar engaged in reverse passing off because they did not attribute riginal
material to Fox).
42 Mamudi, supra note 2, at 14.
43 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 27-28 (observing how that court awarded Dastar's profits to
respondents and then subsequently doubled those profits pursuant to §35 of the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), in order to discourage similar behavior in future); Astrachan,
supra note 37, at 1 (noting that District Court held that public was likely to be confused,
thus awarding profits to Fox and then doubling them to deter other acts of infringement);
Mamudi, supra note 2, at 14 (explaining that case came before Supreme Court after Das-
tar appealed circuit court ruling in favor of Fox).
44 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 539 U.S. 27-28 (2003).
45 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 28 (citing Ninth Circuit holding that standard for both
Lanham Act and state unfair competition claim is whether public is likely to be deceived
or confused by lack of attribution); see also Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entm't
Distrib., 34 Fed. Appx. 312, 316 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding District Court's grant of sum-
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peals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment for Fox, New
Line, and SFM on the "reverse passing off' claim. 46 The amount
of Dastar's copying of Crusade played a substantial part in the
Court of Appeals decision on the §43(a) claim: Dastar's 'bodily
appropriation' of Fox's original Crusade series was deemed suffi-
cient to establish reverse passing off.47 The Court of Appeals
stated that, "Dastar copied substantially the entire Crusade in
Europe series created by Twentieth Century Fox, labeled the re-
sulting product with a different name and marketed it withoutat-
tribution to Fox [and] therefore committed a 'bodily appropria-
tion' of Fox's series."48  The Supreme Court thus granted
certiorari and reversed the Ninth Circuit's findings. 49 Justice
Scalia stated that the Court had to decide whether §43(a) of the
Lanham Act, with its focus on deception of the consumer, pre-
cludes the 'unaccredited copying' of a work. 50
mary judgment for Fox on reverse passing off claim); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v.
Dastar Corp. 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22064 at 2 (granting summary judgment on California
unfair competition law in conjunction with showing of reverse passing off under Lanham
Act). See generally David R. McKinney, Telephone Mnemonics and Complementary Num-
bers: A Review of Trademark and Unfair Competition Law and Policy, 1999 B.Y.U.L. Rev.
435, 459 (1999).
46 See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entm't Distrib., 34 Fed. Appx. 312, 316
(9th Cir. 2002) (reversing as to copyright claim and remanding, while saying nothing
about resolution of state unfair competition claim); see also Astrachan, supra note 37, at 1
(noting Ninth Circuit decision finding for Fox, SFM, and New Line); Mamudi, supra note
2, at 14 (discussing Supreme Court's disagreement with Ninth Circuit holding of reverse
passing off).
47 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 28 (citing Entm't Distrib., 34 Fed. Appx. at 316); see also As-
trachan, supra note 37, at 1 (discussing Ninth Circuit decision finding Dastar had en-
gaged in reverse passing off); Unaccredited, supra note 22, at 27 (discussing 9th Circuit's
holding of reverse passing off).
48 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 28 (citing Entm't Distrib., 34 Fed. Appx. at 316 and explaining
how Court of Appeals also affirmed District Court's §43(a) Lanham Act award of doubling
Dastar's profits). See Unaccredited, supra note 22, at 27 (describing 'bodily appropriation'
as Dastar's work in marking their product with different name, without attribution to
Fox).
49 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 28 (granting certiorari and reversing Ninth Circuit decision);
see also Mamudi, supra note 2, at 14 (discussing Supreme Court's holding reversing
Ninth Circuit decision); Astrachan, supra note 37, at 1 (noting Court's reversal of Ninth
Circuit decision).
50 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 539 U.S. 23, 25 (2003) (noting
that second issue for Court, which was purposely not decided, was "whether a court may
double a profit award under §1117(a), in order to defer future infringing conduct"); see
also Tony Mauro, Lanham Act Ruling Adds to Public Domain Protection, RECORDER
(American Lawyer Media, San Francisco, CA), June 3, 2003, at 1 (explaining how "Justice
Breyer recused himself because his brother, Judge Charles Breyer, had earlier ruled on
the case in the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals"); Mamudi, supra note 2, at 14 (noting
Justice Breyer was recused duel to fact that his brother had heard case in federal court).
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III. DASTAR'S RE-DEFINITION OF "ORIGIN OF GOODS" UNDER
§43(A) OF THE LANHAM ACT
The issue for the Court in Dastar was whether, "in marketing
and selling Campaigns as its own product without acknowledging
its nearly wholesale reliance on the Crusade television series," 51
Dastar Corp. had committed a false designation of origin (and
was thus likely to cause confusion for consumers) 52 under §43(a)
of the Lanham Act. "The court's answer was no, ' 5 with the crux
of the case turning on the meaning of the phrase "origin" of
"goods" under §43.54 The Court's starting point for an answer
seems logical: a dictionary. 55 The heart of Webster's explanation
of "origin" is "source,"56 while its definition of "goods" is "wares;
merchandise."57
Therefore, in relation to the Lanham Act's prohibition of the
false designation of the origin of goods, 58 the Court feels that "the
natural understanding of the "origin" of "goods" - the source of
wares - is the producer of the tangible product sold in the mar-
ketplace, in this case the physical Campaigns videotape sold by
51 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31 (stating 'gravamen' of claim).
52 See id. at 31 (explaining that Dastar marketed and sold Campaigns as its own prod-
uct); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1997) (stating civil liability for parties who are con-
nected to any goods or services); Goforth, supra note 33, at 337 (noting that only question
that Court had to answer was meaning of "origin of goods"); Ronald, supra note 26, at 252
(conveying issues decided by the Court).
63 Greenhouse, supra note 15, at 26 (summing up plaintiff's claims as "whether, in of-
fering its video set as its own product, with only its own employees listed in the screen
credits, Dastar had falsely described the videos' 'origin"').
54 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003) (refer-
ring to dictionary for definition of origin and goods); see also Supreme Court Rejects
Lanham Act Claim for Failure to Attribute Uncopyrighted Work, 10 No. 3 ANDREWS
INTELL. PROP. LITIG. REP., June 10, 2003, at 3 [hereinafter Failure to Attribute] (referring
to this definition as determining element in deciding Dastar's liability); Gasaway, supra
note 7, at 7 (stating that Court made its decision by primarily focusing on difference be-
Tween meaning of "originality" in copyright law and "origin of the goods" in trademark
law).
55 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31 (utilizing dictionary for definitions of origin and goods).
See generally Goforth, supra note 33, at 337 (referring to Court's citing of dictionary for
terms at issue); Ronald, supra note 26, at 252 (discussing Court's dictionary findings).
16 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31 ("the dictionary definition of 'origin' is '[t]he fact or process of
coming into being from a source,' and '[tihat from which anything primarily proceeds;
source"' (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1720-1721 (2d ed. 1949))).
51 Id. at 31 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1079 (2d ed. 1949)).
58 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1997); see also Failure to Attribute, supra note 54, at 3 (com-
municating purpose of act which is relevant to this discussion); Mauro, supra note 50, at 1
(stating that Lanham Act forbids any act that generates confusion regarding origin of
good).
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Dastar"59 - not, importantly, the initial creator of that product.
The Court feels that, as used in §43(a), "the phrase 'origin of
goods' is... incapable of connoting the person or entity that origi-
nated the ideas or communications that 'goods' embody or con-
tain."60 This narrow definition settles the issue: Dastar, as the
originator of those exact videotapes that were placed into the
marketplace, wins the case. 61 There is no merit to Fox's claim;
there is no false designation of origin under §43(a) because Das-
tar indeed identified itself as the origin of the Campaigns vid-
eos.62 This means that Fox, the original creator, the author,63 the
entity that originally "created the work in the copyright sense,"64
does not have a claim, under §43(a), "against a company that
created a video by copying most of a Fox television program
whose copyright had expired."65 The Court's reasons for their
definition of "origin of goods" are: the history and purpose of the
Lanham Act, consistency with precedent, conflict with copyright
law, attribution problems, and customer expectations regarding
origination of a product. 66 Is this holding a setback to writers, or
a benefit to the public domain? Is an action under §43(a) really
merely resurrecting an expired copyright, or simply requesting
credit?
59 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31 (emphasis added). See Mauro, supra note 50, at 1 (commenting
that this definition precludes people who made earlier versions of same from fitting defi-
nition of "origin"); Susser, supra note 5, at 13 (reviewing Court's decision that, "[slince
Dastar actually made the tangible goods it sold, it did not falsely designate anything by
eschewing credit to Fox").
60 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 539 U.S. 23, 32 (2003).
61 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 38 (holding that respondents would not be able to prevail on
their Lanham Act claim); see also Gasaway, supra note 7, at 7 (discussing ramifications
of Court's decision in finding Dastar as origin); Susser, supra note 5, at 13 (stiting that
Court did not consider any awarding of damages).
62See Dastar 539 U.S. at 37 (stating that Dastar has no liability for saying it is producer
of videos); see also Gasaway, supra note 7, at 7 (stating that Dastar is originator of goods
and there is no false statement of origin); Susser, supra note 5, at 13 (clarifying that, be-
cause Dastar in fact manufactured tangible merchandise it sold, it did not falsely desig-
nate something by failing to credit Fox or New Line).
63 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 25 (stating that Fox was given exclusive television rights to
the book); see also Susser, supra note 5, at 13 (explaining that Doubleday licensed televi-
sion rights to Fox); Failure to Attribute, supra note 54, at 3 (stating that Fox was original
creator of television program).
64Gasaway, supra note 7, at 7.
6i Failure to Attribute, supra note 54, at 3.
66 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 539 U.S. 29 (2003) (detailing
reasoning behind their definition); see also Failure to Attribute, supra note 54, at 3 (dis-
cussing that using different definition would conflict with copyright law); Susser, supra
note 5, at 13 (explaining that history of Lanham Act would not allow for any other defini-
tion).
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IV. THE COURT'S JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE DASTAR HOLDING
A. The History and Purpose of the Lanham Act
The Supreme Court's first support for its precluding the origi-
nal author from asserting reverse passing off under a §43(a) false
designation of origin claim is that the chosen definition is in line
with the 'history and purpose' of the Lanham Act itself.67 Indeed,
the Lanham Act "has common law foundations that were not de-
signed to protect originality or creativity. ' 68 Historically, this Act
was intended to protect brand-name goods and the consumers
who buy those goods,69 as well as to give producers of goods an
action against the 'deceptive and misleading use'70 of trademarks.
As initially passed, §43(a) fashioned a federal remedy against
those "who used in commerce either 'a false designation of origin,
or any false description or representation' in connection with 'any
goods or services.' 71 Scalia delves into history, 72 noting that
§43(a)'s original version allowed the term "origin of goods" to en-
67 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 32 (stating that any other definition would be out of accord
with history of Lanham Act); see also Edward Lee, The Public's Domain: The Evolution of
Legal Restraints on the Government's Power to Control Public Access Through Secrecy or
Intellectual Property, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 108 n.67 (2003) (outlining that Supreme Court
chose to decide Dastar's limits to trademark law on statutory grounds, rather than possi-
ble constitutional ones); Susser, supra note 5, at 13 (discussing that broader reading of
plain text would not serve purposes of Lanham Act).
68 Gasaway, supra note 7, at 7.
69 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 32 (stating that Lanham Act protects against trademark in-
fringement that would deceive customers who are loyal to brand); see also Savage, supra
note 12, at 18 (explaining that consumers who buy brand name goods are protected by
Lanham Act); Susser, supra note 5, at 13 (discussing that Act protects deception of con-
sumers).
70 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 539 U.S. 23, 28 (2003) (citing 15
USC § 1127 (2004) (defining initial purpose of Lanham Act to make "actionable the decep-
tive and misleading use of marks," and "to protect persons engaged in .. commerce
against unfair competition").
71 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 29 (explaining Second Circuit observation regarding §43(a)); see
id. at 30 n.3 (citing original 1946 version of §43(a) as focusing on locality, stating that
there is false designation of origin claim "by any person doing business in the locality
falsely indicated as that of origin or the region in which said locality is situated, or by any
person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false de-
scription or representation"). See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 222 F.3d 1262, 1273
n.8 (recognizing language of original version of §43(a)); see also Jean Wegman Burns,
Confused Jurisprudence: False Advertising Under the Lanham Act, 79 B.U.L. REV. 807,
816 (1999) (examining history of interpretation of Lanham Act by federal courts).
72 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 29-30 (reviewing prior interpretation of phrase 'origin of
goods' as stated in original §43(a)); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S.
763, 777 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining how it could be possible to read origi-
nal §43(a)'s definition of 'origin of goods' as meaning "the geographic location in which the
goods originated"); Ronald, supra note 26, at 252 (noting that Court in Dastar considered
Stevens' interpretation from Two Pesos, Inc.).
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compass "not only the actual producer, but also the trademark
owner who commissioned or assumed responsibility for ('stood
behind') production of the physical product."73 However, Scalia
explains that, after the 1988 amendments to §43(a), defining
"origin of goods" to include the original author of a work would be
'stretching' the text of the Lanham Act.74 In the Dastar Court's
unanimous view, such stretching is no longer needed, 75 even
though the Court acknowledges that §43(a) "is one of the few
provisions that goes beyond trademark protection. ' 76 In stating
that §43(a) "does not have boundless application as a remedy for
unfair trade practices,"77 it seems that the Court wants to draw a
line. This can also be seen where the Court states that §43(a)'s
limited wording cannot allow it to function as a complete federal
unfair competition law. 78 "Boundless" and "limited wording" seem
vague reasons for prohibiting the original author of a formerly
copyrighted work to receive attribution under a statute that
remedies false description of origin of goods.
73 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31, 32 n.5 (observing that 1946 version of §43(a) "was read as pro-
viding a cause of action for trademark infringement even where the trademark owner had
not itself produced the goods sold under its mark, but had licensed others to sell under its
name goods produced by them -- the typical franchise arrangement," and showing
that1988 amendments to §43(a) specifically make illegal such confusion as to origin); see
also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2004) (stating civil liability for parties who are connected to any
goods or services).
74 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31-32 (stating natural perception of the words origin and
goods); see also Garrett, supra note 23, at 573 (noting that Ninth Circuit had taken lan-
guage from copyright law and applied it to trademark law); McLain, supra note 11, at 72
(commenting on problems arising from inclusion of original authors under 'origin of
goods.').
71 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 539 U.S. 23, 32-33 (2003)
(clarifying that extending meaning would not be within purpose and history of Lanham
Act); see also Garrett, supra note 23, at 573 (commenting that, in Dastar Justice Scalia
wrote for court and refused to extend meaning of Lanham Act); Richard A. Posner, Mis-
appropriation: A Dirge, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 639 (analyzing Dastar holding that "it is not
trademark infringement to copy an expressive work on which there is no subsisting copy-
right without giving credit to the original author of the work.").
76 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 29 (describing most of Lanham Act as focusing on 'registration,
use, and infringement' of marks).
77 Id. (citing Alfred Dunhill, Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 499 F.2d 232, 237 (2d Cir.
1974) in discussing both original §43(a) and its 1988 amendment).
78 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 29 (citing 4 J. MCCARTHY TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 27:7, p 27-14 (4th ed. 2002) (McCarthy)) (limiting §43(a) to prohibiting
only specific unfair trade practices mentioned in its text); see also High Point Accessories
ex rel. Idea Factory v. Sells-Floto, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5968, 5968 n.1 (1998) (rec-
ognizing Supreme Court's description of wording in §43(a) as 'inherently limited' and its
effect on function of statute); Saunders, supra note 11, at 167 (analyzing language of
Court in Dastar).
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B. The Need (and Desire) for Consistency with Precedent
The Court also does not extend §43(a) to include original crea-
tors because it feels that such an extension would cause trade-
mark law to conflict with precedent. 79 In general, the goal of
trademark law is to protect consumers, not producers,8 0 so this
law is aimed at identifying the producer of goods to protect the
goodwill of businesses and prevent unfair copying.81 Trademark
law does not focus on incentives to innovate,8 2 but is intended to
safeguard customers from being deceived by harmful products.8 3
79 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31-33 (stating desire to define origin of goods as excluding
Fox because such finding would be inconsistent with precedent, as well as stretch text of
Lanham Act); see also Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 267-68 (2004) (recognizing that § 43(a)
does not extend to original creators in wake of Dastar decision); Saunders, supra note 11,
at 161 (explaining that 'origin of goods' in Lanham Act refers to "the producer of the'tan-
gible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the author of an idea or communication
embodied in those goods.").
80 See Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 609 (7th Cir. 1986) (an-
nouncing that
[tihe goal of trademark protection is to allow a firm to affix an identifying mark to its
product (or service) offering that will, because it is distinctive and no competitor may
use a confusingly similar designation, enable the consumer to discover in the least
possible amount of time and with the least possible amount of head-scratching
whether a particular brand is that firm's brand or a competitor's brand.
Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 609 (7th Cir. 1986)); see also Zip
Dee, Inc. v. Dometic Corp., 931 F. Supp. 602, 607 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (stating that goal of
trademark law is "assisting the consumer by avoiding confusion as to a product's
source."); Ashley Packard, Copyright Term Extensions, the Public Domain, and Intertex-
tuality Intertwined, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 14 (2002) (discussing how trademark law has
origins in common law, aiming to stop consumer confusion in marketplace).
Si See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 539 U.S. 23, 32 (2003) (noting
how §43(a) would prohibit action like trademark infringement because it deceives con-
sumers and impairs producer's goodwill); see also Vornado Air Circulation Sys. v. Durac-
raft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1508 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that one core concept of trademark
protection is that sellers' goodwill should be protected); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods.
Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (explaining that trademark law seeks to protect firm's repu-
tation by promoting competition).
82 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2001) (noting how
rewarding manufacturers for innovation in creativity is function of patent law's 'period of
exclusivity'); see also Hubbell Inc. v. Pass & Seymour, No. 94 civ. 7631, U.S.Dist.LEXIS
11050, *6 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that patent laws seek to reward innovation, while
trademark laws do not); Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (an-
nouncing that one purpose of federal patent system is to seek to foster and reward innova-
tion).
83 See Savage, supra note 12, at 18 (noting difference between trademark and patent
law; "copyrights and patents protect creators - authors and inventors --while trademarks
are intended to protect consumers from being fooled by counterfeit products"); see also
American Distilling Co. v. Bellows & Co., 102 Cal.App.2d 8, 24 (1951) (explaining that
trademark law "is not made for the protection of experts, but for the public - - that vast
multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous, who, in making
purchases, do not stop to analyze, but are governed by appearance and general impres-
sions." (citing Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 359 (9th Cir. 1948)); Georgia
Carpet Sales, Inc. v. SLS Corp., 789 F.Supp. 244, 246 (N.D.Ill.1992) (explaining that law
is designed to prevent public from being 'unwittingly deceived').
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Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co. 8 4 states that prevention of
unfair copying "helps assure a producer that it (and not an imi-
tating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related re-
wards associated with a desirable product."8 5 Rather than bol-
stering their Dastar decision, this Qualitex comment appears to
reinforce Fox's argument for attribution because Dastar fits the
'imitating competitor' 86 that the Lanham Act targets. After all,
Dastar Corp. copied and made only minor changes to the Crusade
series.8 7 However, in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays,
Inc.,88 the Supreme Court states that legal protections must
"subsist with the recognition that in many instances there is no
prohibition against copying goods and products."8 9 Tra/Fix avows,
"copying is not always discouraged or disfavored by the laws
which preserve our competitive economy." 90 Citing TrafFix, the
Dastar Court notes the care taken to "caution against misuse or
over-extension' of trademark and related protections into areas
traditionally occupied by patent or copyright."91
84 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at162-63 (affirming that, "the courts and the patent and Trade-
mark Office have authorized for use as a mark a particular shape (of a Coca-Cola bottle),
a particular sound (of NBC's three chimes), and even a particular scent (of plumeria blos-
soms on sewing thread)").
85 Id. at 164 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (observing that this will
encourage 'production of quality products'). See Daster, 539 U.S. at 34 (citing Qualitex as
support).
86 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163-64 (noting that these competitors are discouraged from sell-
ing inferior products). See, e.g., Williams v. UMG Recordings, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1183
(C.D.Cal. 2003) (noting that trademark law prevents imitating competitors from reaping
both financial and reputation related rewards); see also Felix the Cat Prods. v. New Line
Cinema, No.99 cv 9339, U.S.Dist.LEXIS 21763, *6 (C.D.Cal.2000) (explaining that
Lanham Act targets imitating competitors to assure potential customers that an item
they like is "made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she
liked (or disliked) in the past.").
87 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 539 U.S. 23, 26 (2003) (sug-
gesting that these minor changes were not equivalent of misrepresenting someone else's
goods or services as your own); Ochoa, supra note 16, at 911 (stating facts of Dastar case);
Richeson, supra note 11, at 218 (explaining Dastart edited beta cam tapes of original tele-
vision series).
8 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001) (holding that claim is barred if there is no trade protection for
functional feature).
89 Id.
.9 Id. (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989))(noting that in some situations copying can be quite beneficial).
91 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34 (citing TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29) (discussing precedent as reason
for narrow 'origin' definition). See Bohrer, supra note 23, at 23 (highlighting that Court
saw Dastar case as opportunity to distinguish trademark law from patent and copyright
law and caution against application of trademark law into these two other areas); see also
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Seventh Annual Honorable Helen Wilson Nies Memorial Lec-
ture in Intellectual Property Law, The Trademark Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 8
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 187, 206 (2004) (noting that Court in TrafFix was careful to
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Indeed, in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,92 the Court af-
firms that "sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected
by.. .trademark 93 is a public concern. The key here, according to
precedent, is the entry into the public domain of innovative en-
terprises and technologies. 94 In the Moseley v. V Secret Cata-
logue95 decision, the Court declined to find that §43(a) has
"boundless application as a remedy for unfair trade practices." 96
Consistent with history, Dastar holds, if Dastar Corp.'s self-
description as "the 'Producer' of its videos amounted to a repre-
sentation that it originated the creative work conveyed by the
videos, allowing a cause of action under §43(a).. .would create a
species of mutant copyright law that limits the public's "federal
right to 'copy and to use,"' expired copyrights."97
caution against misuse of overextension of Lanham Act and was clearly moving towards
narrower view of trademark law).
92 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
93 Id. (noting that public is deeply interested in sharing in goodwill of article no longer
protected by patent). See Gwendolyn Gill, Through the Back Door: Attempts to Use Trade
Dress to Protect Expired Patents, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1269, 1287 (1999) (highlighting that
Court found that public has right to enjoy article upon expiration of patent); see also Wil-
liam P. Kratzke, The Supreme Court and Trade Dress- A Short Comment, 24 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 73, 84 (2001) (stating that Court's decision was guided by principle
that one should be able to imitate publicly known, unpatented articles).
94 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989) (ex-
plaining that ultimate goal of patent is to promote free competition in exploitation of un-
patented designs and innovations); see also Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S.
257, 262 (1979) (stating that "the stringent requirements for patent protection seek to en-
sure that ideas in the public domain remain there for the use of the public"); Comedy III
Prods. v. New Line Cinema, 200 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding "the Lanham Act
cannot be used to circumvent copyright law. If material covered by copyright law has
passed into the public domain, it cannot then be protected by the Lanhan Act without
rendering the Copyright Act a nullity").
Bonito, 489 U.S. at 150-151. See Comedy III Prods. v.. New Line Cinema, 200 F.3d 593,
595 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding "the Lanham Act cannot be used to circumvent copyright law.
If material covered by copyright law has passed into the public domain, it cannot then be
protected by the Lanhan Act without rendering the Copyright Act a nullity"); BriefAmici
Curiae of Intellectual Property Law Professors in Support of Dastar Corporation, 24
WHITTIER L. REV. 931, 941 (Summer, 2003) [herinafter "Law Professors'] (citing cases
which held material that entered public domain cannot be protected by Lanham Act).
- 537 U.S. 418 (2002).
95 537 U.S. 418 (2002).
9 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 418. See Jennifer Elgin, Supreme Court Holds that Lanham Act
Does Not Protect The Right to Claim Authorship in a Literary Work, MONDAQ LTD., June
20, 2003, at 1 (noticing 'echo' between Dastar and Moseley's strict interpretations of
§43(a)); see also Stephen W. Feingold, et al., Supreme Court Will Decide Whether Fair Use
Defense Survives a Showing of Likely Confusion, INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST, April 7, 2004,
at 1 (noting that Supreme Court has consistently scaled back relief for trademark holder
over last twelve years).
91 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003) (citing Bo-
nito, 489 U.S. at 165) (emphasis added).
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C. Conflict with Copyright Law: That "Carefully Crafted
Bargain' S
1. Copyright Law
Legal specialists "praised the [Supreme Court's Dastar] ruling
for clarifying the difference between copyrights and trade-
marks."99 Another reason why the Court does not extend §43(a)
to include original creators is because they feel that such an ex-
tension would cause trademark law to conflict with the law of
copyright. 100 In contrast to trademark law, the Constitution di-
rectly grants Congress the power to regulate copyright and pat-
ent law '01 in the Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitu-
tion,102 which functions as "an economic incentive to encourage
individuals to produce more work, thereby contributing to the
progress of science and the arts, which in turn benefits the gen-
eral public welfare." 10 3 Creators obtain copyright security, but
only for a specific time, so their works ultimately become free for
public use. 104 This limited monopoly under copyright law oper-
98 Bonito, 489 U.S. at 150-51 (referring to protection that copyright holder receives by
having its work copyrighted, and then to beneficial access that public receives when that
work's copyright expires and public has right to copy that work without attribution).
99 Savage, supra note 12, at 18.
100 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34 (stating that "[Iln construing the Lanham Act, we have
been careful to caution against misuse or over-extension of trademark and related protec-
tions into areas traditionally occupied by patent and copyright."); see also Unaccredited,
supra note 22, at 27 (highlighting that Court recognized that purchasers often have inter-
est in ideas and communications of producs they buy. However, the Court also noted that
application of Lanham Act to such products would create conflict with copyright law); Ga-
saway, supra note 7, at 7 (noting how crediting authors of un-copyrighted work conflicts
with law of copyright).
101 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 8 (securing authors and inventors exclusive rights);
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 104 S. Ct. 774, 782-783 (noting that
Congress has power to define scope of limited copyright monopoly and to craft patent and
copyright laws); Packard, supra note 80, at 14 (affirming how "copyright and patent law
draw their force from the Constitution").
102 U.S. CONST. art. §8, cl. 8 (stating, "the Congress shall have power ... To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inven-
tors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"). See Sony, 104 S.
Ct. at 783 (noting Congress' Constitutional authority); Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 306
(stating Congress' authority stems from Constitution).
103 Packard, supra note 80, at 14-15. See Christina N. Gifford, The Sonny Bono Copy-
right Extension Act, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 363, 373 (2000) (discussing Framers' intent to
recognize need for protecting creative work).
104 See Jaime Davids, Eldred v. Ashcroft: A Critical Analysis of the Supreme Court Deci-
sion, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 173, 176 (2003). (explaining need to balance pro-
tection with importance of having "widespread dissemination of creative works"); see also
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 109 S. Ct. 971, 975 (1989) (noting Con-
gress may not grant unlimited monopoly over intellectual property rights); Ronald, supra
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ates to balance the opposing interests of the general public with a
work's creators, who benefit in reaping monetary and social re-
wards for their creation.105
2. Dastar and Copyright Expiration
It is the limitation of the copyright monopoly on a work that
draws the Dastar Court's attention. The public gains the right to
copy, without attribution, 10 6 once a copyright expires. The Court
discusses patent law: once a patent has expired, the public has
the right to make the formerly patented object in exactly the
same shape.1 0 7 This is implicit in the 'carefully crafted bargain
' 08
that copyright holders agree to when they create their works un-
der copyright law. "It has been well established that in the case
of an expired patent, the federal patent laws do create a federal
right to 'copy and to use."'10 9 The proper form of copyright protec-
tion, if one desires attribution under the law of copyright, is a
copyright registration. 1 0 Fox let its copyright expire;1" hence,
note 26, at 243 (positing that title case "may ultimately stand for principle that authors
and other copyright owners lose all intellectual property rights in their creative works
once copyrights expires").
105 See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774, 782 (dis-
cussing public purpose achieved by limited monopoly grant); see also Packard, supra note
80, at 14-15 (noting that public has interest in access to works protected by copyright);
Ronald, supra note 26, at 255 (commenting on merits of public policy that allows lower
cost access to public domain goods while retaining ability to proscute cases involving real
deception).
106 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003) (clarifying that
once copyright expires right to copy is with public); Garrett, supra note 23, at 573 (noting
that essence of Dastar opinion is public domain materials may be used without attribu-
tion). See generally Davids, supra note 104, at 176 (discussing importance of limited time
for protection to encourage dissemination of information).
107 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33 (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,
230 (1964)) (discussing right to make article whose patent has expired); see also Kellogg v
Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120-22 (1938) (discussing when object has entered public
there are no exclusive rights to the form); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S.169,
185 (1896) (stating when patent expires manufacturer does not have monopoly).
108 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989)) (noting that under this bargain, "once the patent or copyright
monopoly has expired, the public may use the invention or work at will and without attri-
bution"). See Saunders, supra note 11, at 169-170 (discussing what is gained and by
whom in this bargain).
109 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989).
110 See Elgin, supra note 96, at 1 (proposing Fox should have not allowed its copyright to
expire); see also TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001)
(stating, "in general, unless an intellectual property right such as a patent or copyright
protects an item, it will be subject to copying'); Saunders, supra note 11, at 162 (noting
proper type of protection for attribution rights).
"I See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 26 (stating Fox did not renew copyright on Crusade televi-
sion series); see also McLain, supra note 11, at 87 (noting Fox's failure to renew copy-
right"); Ronald, supra note 26, at 250 (stating Fox failed to renew its copyright).
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Crusade in Europe was in the public domain. One interpretation
is that the Dastar "Court merely prevented Fox from getting re-
lief through the Lanham Act back door that it could not get
through the copyright front door .... The high court saw Fox's
lawsuit as an effort to resurrect its expired copyright, despite
Fox's protestations that it only wanted proper credit."112 Holding
as Fox wanted would, in some views, "stifle competition in the fu-
ture."11
3
What could Fox have done under trademark law to change this
outcome? First, "if Fox had renewed the Crusade in Europe tele-
vision series, it would have had a claim for copyright infringe-
ment."11 4 If Dastar had gone to a store to purchase some of New
Line's Crusade videotapes, and then simply repackaged those
tapes as their own, then Fox 'undoubtedly' would have a claim of
reverse passing off.11 5 However, the Court, in distinguishing Das-
tar's acts as very discrete from mere repackaging, returned to the
important fact that Fox's copyright had expired.116 The Supreme
Court characterized Dastar's actions as taking a "creative WORK
in the public domain-the Crusade television series - [copying]
it, [making] modifications (arguably minor), and [producing]
its very own series of videotapes."'"1 7 Since Dastar copied the
tapes, but changed Fox's original series to produce its own tapes,
the Court holds Dastar as the origin of the tapes it sold."18 One
112 Susser, supra note 5, at 13 (noting what motivated suit was Dastar's cheaper version
in direct competition with Fox).
113 Mamudi, supra note 2, at 14 (characterizing Court's holding in Dastar).
114 Failure to Attribute, supra note 54, at 3 (commenting how Fox could have copyright
infringement or misrepresentation claims).
115 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003) (stating that
Fox's reverse passing off claim would be sustained if Dastar had repackaged New Line's
Crusade videotapes as its own."); see also John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant
Props., Inc., 322 F.3d 26, 45 (2003) (defining reverse passing off as "where the defendant
falsely attributes the plaintiffs product to itself or a third party"); Ochoa, supra note 16,
at 922 (defining reverse passing off as defendant placing its own mark on merchandise
made by plaintiff).
116 See Craft, supra note 19, at 36 (noting that when copyright expires, no attribution is
required); Michael Rosenbloum, Give Me Liberty and Give Me Death: The Conflict Between
Copyright Law and Estates Law, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 163, 164 (1997) (stating that origi-
nal 1909 "Copyright Act provided that if the author of a copyrighted work was still living
when the first copyright term expired, he or she had to renew the copyright in order to
receive continued protection").
117 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31 (elucidating that if 'origin' applies only to "manufacturer or
producer of the physical 'goods' that are made available to the public (in this case the
videotapes), Dastar was the origin").
118 See Craft, supra note 19, at 36 (noting "Dastar took a work in the public domain, cop-
ied and made minor changes, and produced its own videos"); see also Failure to Attribute,
supra note 54, at 3 (stating that "origin of goods" refers to the "producer of goods and not
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critique of this distinction in behavior between straight repackag-
ing and minor changes is that the. lack of a straight line bound-
ary for where reverse passing off ends. 119
3. Dastar and the Copyright Act
Some supporters of the Court's definition of the "origin of
goods" as the producer of the tangible product in the market-
place 120 refer to the Copyright Act's use of the term 'author."121
Under the Court's decision, Dastar properly branded itself as the
origin of the tapes.122 "The maker of the Dastar videotape was the
person who made the copy, not the author under the Copyright
Act.... [c]orrectly identifying the author of a work is not the
same thing as correctly identifying the maker of a copy of the
work."'123 Under §102(a) of the Copyright Act, copyright protec-
tion subsists in original works of authorship 'fixed in any tangi-
the author"); Susser, supra note 5, at 13 (noting that Court held "origin" to refer to "pro-
ducer of tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to author of any idea.").
119 See Waldman Publishing Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 498, 501 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (noting that "the concept of reverse passing off is of broad dimension, limited only
by the ingenuity of wrongdoers seeking to mislead"); see also Susser, supra note 5, at 13
(criticizing Court for its lack of guidance regarding reverse passing off).
120 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31 (stating that most common interpretation of "origin of
goods" is producer"); Williams v. UMG Recordings, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1182 (C.D.Cal.
2003) (citing Dastar's definition of origin of goods); Bretford Mfg. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Co.,
286 F. Supp. 2d 969, 971 (N.D.Ill. 2003) (applying Dastar's definition of origin of goods).
121 See Saunders, supra note 11, at 170 (explaining that Lanham Act does not exist to
reward originality in authorship, but instead prohibits actions like trademark infringe-
ment that deceive consumers and impair producer's goodwill and assures producer that it
will reap financial, reputation-related rewards associated with product); see also Joshua
K. Simko, Comment: "Every Artist is a Cannibal, Every Poet is a Thief": Why The Supreme
Court was Right to Reverse the Ninth Circuit in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp., 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 355, 365 (2004) (noting that there is conflict between
Justice Scalia's definition of origin of goods as producer of tangible product sold in mar-
ketplace and definition of origin of goods as connoting person or entity that originated
ideas or communications that 'goods' embody or contain, i.e., 'author). See generally 17
U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (outlining as 'works of authorship' literary works, musical works,
dramatic works, pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial, graphic and sculptural
works, motion pictures and other audiovisual works, sound recordings, and architectural
works).
122 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003) (concluding most
natural understanding of 'origin' of 'goods' is producer of tangible product sold in market-
place, in this case physical Campaigns videotape sold by Dastar.); see also Zyla v.
Wadsworth, 360 F.3d 243, 252 (1st Cir. 2004) (stating "The Court found that no false des-
ignation of origin had occurred because Dastar accurately identified itself as the manufac-
turer of the physical video, even if it had not accurately credited others for the creative
content of the video."). See generally Mauro, supra note 50, at 2 (discussing ramifications
for Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. of Court's definition of 'origin of goods').
123 Justin Beck, Man vs. Machine in the Halls of Justice, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 3, 2003, at
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ble medium of expression. 124 Here, 'originality' does not require
complete novelty, but refers to the person "whose creative en-
deavor brought the work to fruition... [who] might be the pro-
ducer of a motion picture, the author of a novel, or the developer
of software."'125 The statutory language of §102(a) ensures that a
work's author did not copy that work from some other entity. 126
Therefore, Dastar supporters praise the Court for clarifying that
'origin' under the Lanham Act is distinct from 'original' under the
Copyright Act.127 Dastar shows the Court's belief that "the copy-
right statute itself creates a right to do such copying."128
4. The Public Domain: An Important Aspect of Copyright
Law
A copyright necessarily and immediately attaches when one
creates a fixed, original work of authorship. 129 Under copyright
law, "the right to copy without attribution once a copyright has
expired is precisely what passes to the public when copyright
protection terminates."'' 30 The largest category of public domain
124 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a) (2000) (highlighting that "copyright protection subsists.. .in origi-
nal works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression").
125 Gasaway, supra note 7, at 7 (noting difference in meaning between term 'originality'
in copyright law, and 'origin of goods' in trademark law).
126 See Id. (summing up Copyright Act); see also Shubha Ghosh, Deprivatizing Copy-
right, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387, 396 (2003) (explaining "a world without copyright
[law] ... [is] a world in which creators of works could not prevent others from appropriat-
ing their work either through reproduction, adaptation, or performance."). See generally
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (defining "copyright protection subsists ... in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression").
127 See Dastar, 539 U.S. 31 (defining 'origin of goods' under §43(a) of Lanham Act); see
also Garrett, supra note 23, at 573 (noting "commentators hailed this decision [for, inter
alia, establishing that] . .. 'trademark law cannot be used as a subterfuge to extend the
limited exclusivity enjoyed by copyrights and patents"'); Savage, supra note 12, at 18
(stating "Legal experts praised the ruling for clarifying the difference between copyrights
and trademarks").
128 Posner, supra note 75, at 639.
129 See 17 U.S.C. §102 (a) (2000) (explaining "Copyright protection subsists . .. in origi-
nal works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."); see also Importance of the Public
Domain, SPEcIAL LIBR. ASS'N INFO. OUTLOOK, July 1, 2001, at 32 [herinafter Importance]
(stating "copyright automatically attaches when one creates a fixed, original work of au-
thorship"); R. Scott Griffin, Note & Comment: A Malpractice Suit Waiting to Happen: The
Conflict between Perfecting Security Interests in Patents and Copyrights (a Note on Pere-
grine, Cybernetic, and Their Progeny), 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 765, 771 (2004) (commenting
that ownership of copyright attaches to author at time work is fixed in tangible medium).
13 Gasaway, supra note 7, at 7. See Importance, supra note 129, at 32 (clarifying that
Copyright Act "does not define public domain. Instead, it details the conditions necessary
for copyright protection, the types of works that are eligible for protection, the rights of
copyright holders and the exceptions to these exclusive rights").
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works is composed of just such expired copyright works - like
Fox's Crusades.131 The public domain denotes works unprotected
by intellectual property rights.132 A public domain work can be
used 'by anyone in any manner imaginable without the need to
acquire or pay for rights. There are no royalties to be paid, and
no option payments."1 33
The Dastar decision seems to validate the public domain's im-
portance in ruling "§43(a) does not prevent the unaccredited
copying of an uncopyrighted work."'134 Dastar copied a work that
had fallen into the public domain, and the Court ruled that once
a copyright expires, others may copy the work "and pass it off as
their own without incurring liability."' 35 Supporters of the public
domain feel that 'in the era of information,' there are many bene-
fits from a sprawling, less restrained public domain.13 6 "A vigor-
1 See Importance, supra note 129, at 32 (noting three categories of works in public do-
main in addition to expired copyrights); see also Edward Samuels, Eldred v. Ashcroft: In-
tellectual Property, Congressional Power, and the Constitution: The Public Domain Revis-
ited, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 389, 391 (2002) (noting category of materials in public domain
which have had their copyrights extended from twenty-eight years to lifetime of author
plus seventy years, and materials in public domain due to forfeiture of copyright); Edward
Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 41 J. COPYRIGHT SocY 137, 151-52 (1993)
(stating that category of materials in public domain which has greatest "historical and
theoretical footing" are works which have expired copyright).
132 See Beck, supra note 123, at 19 (noting Dastar defense position that if copy is made
of public domain work, those copies 'originate' with copier); see also James Boyle, The
Public Domain: Foreword: The Opposite of Property?, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 30
(2003) (noting that information in public domain is "free" and that freedom associated
with public domain has varied meanings); Importance, supra note 129, at 32 (positing
that work in public domain is "opposite of a copyrighted work" in that "[i]f the work is
within the public domain, there are no ownership rights associated with the work. It may
be said that everyone and no one owns the work. Therefore, anyone may reproduce the
work, distribute it, adapt it, etc.").
133 Jay S. Kenoff & Richard K. Rosenberg, Methods for Obtaining Rights in Property to
Produce Plays, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 27, 1991, at 5 (reiterating that much care should be taken in
determining whether work is in fact in public domain). See Dr. James Otieno-Odek, Pub-
lic Domain in Patentability After the Uruguay Round: A Developing Country's Perspective
with Specific Reference to Kenya, 4 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 15, 15 (1995) (proposing that
"[tihe public domain is the pool from which inventors have an unfettered right to extract
information without fear of encroaching on third party patent rights"); c.f. Andrew Beck-
erman-Rodau, Are Ideas Within the Traditional Definition of Property?: A Jurisprudential
Analysis, 47 ARK. L. REV. 603, 642 (1994) (stating that since materials that are in public
domain are not property, they are "not subject to property rights").
134 Craft, supra note 19, at 36 (noting that Dastar "took a work in the public domain,
copied and made minor changes, and produced its own videos").
135 Greenhouse, supra note 15, at A26 (noting, however, that ruling could have limited
effect because case's facts were "unusual').
136 See Jaime Davids, Eldred v. Ashcroft: A Critical Analysis of the Supreme Court Deci-
sion, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 173, 174 (2003) (specifying that archives such as
libraries and Internet allow people to access information in public domain at no cost); see
also Edward Lee, supra note 67, at 119 (noting that "[t]he public domain ... delineates an
important sphere in which people have equal rights, and ultimate power, over informa-
tion, ideas, and knowledge"); Robert K. Paterson & Dennis S. Karjala, Traditional Knowl-
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ous and broad public domain is imperative for the creation of lo-
cal inventiveness and an adaptive research capability. It is also
critical to the creation of a cadre of scientific personnel.7137 "Li-
brarians, researchers, and Internet archivists lauded the deci-
sion," because it drew a line - the phrase 'origin of goods' in
§43(a) does not require a subsequent user of a public domain
work to inform the audience of who created the original. 138 Das-
tar "removes the cloud of Lanham Act liability from companies,
libraries, Web sites, and databases that repackage facts or infor-
mation that originated elsewhere."'139 The Lanham Act can no
longer be used as a weapon against use of material that has en-
tered the public domain.140
Critics of Dastar claim that the ruling is "setback to the writers
and producers of older works, ruling that the original creators of
films, books, and songs whose copyrights have expired do not
have a right to be credited on new works that rely on the origi-
nal."'141 When a "copyright expires and a work enters the public
domain, don't look to trademark law for a continuing right of at-
tribution. The Court could have stopped there, but went much
further by finding - some say resurrecting - a federal right to
copy and use works in the public domain."142
edge, Intellectual Property, and Indigenous Culture: Looking Beyond Intellectual Property
in Resolving Protection of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Indigenous Peoples, 11
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 633, 649 (2003) (arguing that everyone benefits from large
intellectual property public domain, and therefore public domain cannot be eliminated
simply on rationale that "some of it belongs to a specifically identifiable cultural heri-
tage").
137 Otieno-Odek, supra note 133, at 16 (asserting that, for effective patent system, viable
public domain is key).
138 See Savage, supra note 12, at 18 (noting that responsibility of attribution no longer
burdens librarians). But c.f. Gasaway, supra note 7, at 21 (contending that some librari-
ans find not attributing work to its original author "unethical and misleading"). See gen-
erally Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003) (finding that "origin
of goods" denotes "producer of the tangible product sold in the marketplace").
139 Mauro, supra note 50, at 1 (explaining that ruling could limit amount of lawsuits
filed by persons who claim they did not receive sufficient acknowledgement for their
work).
140 See Garrett, supra note 74, at 578 (stating that Lanham Act cannot be used to prose-
cute every kind of "unfair trade practice"); see also Mauro, High Court Hands Fox Copy-
right Defeat, E-COMMERCE L. & STRATEGY, June 13, 2003, at 3 (noting that recent cases
have used Lanham Act to prosecute copyright infringement, but Act cannot be used
against Dastar); Simko, supra note 121, at 368 (arguing that "trademark law cannot and
should not be an end-run around copyright protection").
141 Savage, supra note 12, at 18 (noting that "works in the public domain can be freely
copied and revised for sale to the public - and without crediting the original creator").
142 Fries, supra note 36, at 30.
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5. 'The Eldred Quandary': Dastar and Copyright Consistency
Other Dastar critics point to the looming shadow of the Su-
preme Court's controversial Eldred v. Ashcroft143 decision - and
the apparent contradiction with the Court's statement in Dastar
that its narrow definition of "origin of goods" comes from a desire
to be consistent with precedent. 144 In Eldred, the Court upheld
the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA),145
which extended the terms of copyright protection. 146 The CTEA
adds twenty more years of copyright protection to current and fu-
ture copyright holders, 47 and does not affect any works that have
already fallen into the public domain. 48 Most copyrights, under
this Act, now run from creation until 70 years after the author's
death. 149 "For anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and
works made for hire, the term is 95 years from publication or 120
143 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
144 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 32 (2003) (noting that "the
phase 'origin of goods' was incapable of denoting the person or entity that originated the
ideas" that goods conatin). See generally Saunders, supra note 11, at 162 (reiterating
Court's view that phrase "origin of goods" referred to producer of tangible goods); Bohrer,
supra note 23, at 6 (noting that Court narrowly defined meaning of phrase "origin of
goods").
145 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2004).
146 See William Patry, Court Takes Hands Off Approach on Copyrights, N.Y. L. J., May
12, 2003, at 7 (stating that CTEA generously extended terms of copyright protection for
another 20 years). See generally Dennis Harney, Mickey Mousing the Copyright Clause of
the U.S. Constitution: Eldred v. Reno, 27 DAYTON L. REV. 291, 291 (2002) (declaring that
CTEA extended terms of copyright protection); Michael Keyes, Whatever Happens to
Works Deferred?: Reflections on the Ill-Given Deferments of Copyright Term Extention Act,
26 SEATTLE UNIV. L. R. 97, 98 (2002) (noting that "amendment grants a twenty-year pub-
lic domain deferment to those copyright holders with existing copyrights in works of au-
thorship").
147 See id. (noting that "historically, Congress treated all copyright holders the same, ex-
tending durations to existing and future copyrights"). See generally Eldred, 537 U.S. at
195 (observing that CTEA retains 'general structure of the 1976 Copyright Act'); Craft,
supra note 19, at 36 (highlighting that copyright protection for current and future copy-
right holders is seventy years).
148 See Copyright Holders, supra note 34, at D5 (remarking on substantial lobbying re-
garding CTEA by Hollywood film studios, including Walt Disney Co. - whose numerous
Mickey Mouse copyrights would have expired in 2003 without CTEA's twenty-year copy-
right extension); see also Davids, supra note 136, at 174 (stating that CTEA does not af-
fect any works that have already fallen into the public domain); Harney, supra note 146,
at 291 (noting that trademarks did not enter public domain as a result of CTEA).
149 See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (a)(2004) (announcing that "copyright ... endures for... 70 years
after the author's death"); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003) (noting
that under act, most copyrights "now run from creation until seventy years after the au-
thor's death"); Patry, supra note 146, at s7 (noting that "as a result of the decision, for
works created on or after Jan. 1, 1978, the term of copyright for individual authors is life
of the author plus 70 years; for works first published before that date, the term is 95 years
from the date of first publication").
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years from creation, whichever expires first."' 50 The Supreme
Court held "that the CTEA is a rational enactment; we are not at
liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy
judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise
they may be."'15 1
In part, the Eldred opinion rejected a challenge that the CTEA
violated the First Amendment 152 in keeping 'millions of works'
out of the public domain for twenty years longer than before -
and thus encroaching on the freedoms of speech and press by re-
jecting the public's access to these works. 5 3 The CTEA's exten-
sion of copyright protection affects the bargain that balances the
rights of copyrights holders - and their desire for 'exclusive
rights' under copyright protection - with the public's desire for
access to such works when copyrights expire. 54 Copyrights are
granted for limited terms to encourage creation of new works,
which will in time enter the public domain. 55 Supporters of copy-
right extensions claim such extra copyright protection encour-
150 17 U.S.C. §302(a) (2004) (announcing that "in a case of annonimous work ... the
copyright endures for the term of 95 years ... or a term of 120 years ... whichever expires
first"); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 196.
151 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 208.
152 See Craft, supra note 19, at 36 (specifying that Court also rejected contention that
Act could not apply to current copyrights, or went beyond Constitution's proscribed "lim-
ited Times" specification for copyright monopolies); see also Sue Ann Mota, Eldred v. Reno
- Is The Copyright Term Extension Act Constitutional?, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 167, 168
(2001) (noting that Court of Appeals in Eldred v. Reno held that Congress was not prohib-
ited from extending copyright term by either Copyright Clause or First Amendment). See
generally U.S. CONST. amend. I (affirming that "Congress shall make no law.. .abridging
the freedom of speech or of the press").
153 See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 374 (2001) (explaining plaintiffs' claim that Copy-
right Term Extension Act was unconstitutional for three reasons, including notion that
copyright extension violated "limited times" requirement of Copyright Clause). See gener-
ally U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating that Congress may not create any law that limits free-
dom of speech).
154 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 244 (2003) (describing way in which statute
that exceeds limitations of Copyright Clause may create conflict between Clause and First
Amendment, thereby depriving public of benefits of free speech); see also William Patry,
The United States and International Copyright Law: From Berne to Eldred, 40 HOUS. L.
REV. 749, 759 (2003) (discussing bargain one enters into with copyright protection); Patry,
supra note 146, at s7 (noting that CTEA results in "an undeserved and unnecessary wind-
fall...given to copyright holders.").
155 See Beck, supra note 123, at 19 (explaining that precedent has established that copy-
rights are granted for limited terms in order to promote creation of new works that will
one day enter public domain); see also Mark B. Radefeld, The Medium is the Message:
Copyright Law Confronts the Information Age in New York Times v. Tasini, 36 AKRON L.
REV. 545, 547 (2003) (stating that authors are granted only limited monopoly in their
work as incentive to create and circulate their work in order to achieve ultimate goal of
furthering "the progress of science and the useful arts").
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ages even more creativity.15 6 Critics of Eldred, claiming over-
breadth, 157 claim that, "extending.. .already existing copyrights
does not encourage the creation of new works... [or fit] easily
into what appeared to be a well-established constitutional
framework." 5 8
How, then, can Eldred's extension of copyright protection - and
thus narrowing the public domain - reconcile with Dastar's focus
on the rule that, once a copyright expires, the work falls into the
public domain? Indeed, how is Dastar consistent with this prece-
dent? "When the Court took [Dastar], many Court watchers were
surprised. Some theorized that the justices were looking to coun-
terbalance Eldred v. Ashcroft, their Jan. 15 ruling that the CTEA
is constitutional."'159 The Dastar opinion even cites to Eldred,
finding the phrase "origin of goods" to encompass the original
creator (Fox) would "be akin to finding that §43(a) creates a spe-
cies of perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may not
do.'1
6 0
The congruency of Eldred and Dastar are debated. Some ob-
servers feel that the two decisions differ from each other,1 1 and
state that the Dastar decision, "in giving added protection to the
public domain ' 162 and allowing "greater freedom for those who
1- See Senator Orrin G. Hatch & Thomas R. Lee, "To Promote the Progress of Science":
The Copyright Clause and Congress's Power to Extend Copyrights, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH
1, 3 (2002) (arguing that evidentiary record prior to enactment of Copyright Term Exten-
sion Act demonstrates that term extensions would further science by promoting creation
and distribution of copyrighted material); see also Packard, supra note 80, at 3 (asserting
that supporters of Copyright Term Extension Act believe that term extensions will pro-
mote creativity); Patry, supra note 146, at s7 (noting that other CTEA supporters feel that
twenty year extension does indeed fulfill Constitution's "limited Times" decree in Art. I,
§8, cl. 8)
157 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 198 (stating that Court of Appeals has clearly demonstrated
that same Copyright Clause allows Congress to "amplify the terms of an existing pat-
ent."); see also Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003) (dem-
onstrating that Congress may not create perpetual patents or copyrights); Patry, supra
note 146, at s7 (predicting that such breadth will spill over into other areas, namely pat-
ent legislation).
158 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that
"limited times" provision promotes progress of science by ensuring that protected innova-
tions will enter public domain upon term expiration).
159 Fries, supra note 36, at 30 (commenting Eldred is constitutional decision while Das-
tar remains case of statutory construction).
160 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003) (citing Eldred, 537
U.S. at 208).
161 See Mauro, supra note 50, at 1 (stating difference between decisions); see also
McLain, supra note 11, at 87 (calling attention to Court's differing concerns in Eldred and
Dastar); Saunders, supra note 11, at 175 (noting apparent contrast between Court's ex-
pansion of copyright owners' rights in Eldred and restriction of those rights in Dastar).
162 Mauro, supra note 50, at 1 (emphasis added).
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plagiarize works already in the public domain,"'163 stands in con-
trast to Eldred's rule that "Congress could limit the public do-
main by substantially extending copyrights."'164 Other observers
state that Eldred and Dastar are consistent 165 because both
strengthen copyright holders' rights and narrow the public do-
main. These supporters feel that the court created an equilib-
rium between the two cases, in Eldred's deferral to Congressional
legislation that stretches the length of time a work may be pro-
tected, and thus, kept out of the public domain, as well as Das-
tar's later conceding considerable liberty to users of works al-
ready in the public domain due to crucial copyright expiration. 166
The Supreme Court has "struck the proper balance between the
rights of copyright holders and the rights of the public to use
works whose copyrights have expired and are thus in the public
domain." 167 Indeed, Eldred and Dastar both stress that "every
idea, theory, and fact in a copyrighted work becomes instantly
available for public exploitation at the moment of publication."1 68
It is such precedent that allowed the Dastar result to be 'predict-
able ' 69 in its focus on copyright expiration because "a work in the
public domain can be copied and distributed by anyone.... The
plaintiffs problem was not a false designation of origin, but the
163 Copyright Holders, supra note 34, at D5 (characterizing Dastar).
164 Mauro, supra note 50, at 1 (emphasis added).
165 See Copyright Holders, supra note 34, at D5 (concluding that "at first blush, Dastar
and Eldred appear to be a schizophrenic approach to the issues presented. Closer exami-
nation, however, reveals striking consistencies between the opinions"); see aso Saunders,
supra note 11, at 175-76 (finding reconciliation through broader consideration of Dastar
and Eldred. Both opinions demonstrate "the Court's willingness to reinforce a copyright
owner's exlusive rights ... as well as the Court's reluctance to circumscribe the availabli-
lity of works already in the public domain. Overall these decisions both represent "the
Court's ongoing deference to Congress in [copyright] matters"); id. at 162 (contending that
Court has struck "balance between the rights of copyright owners and the rights of the
public to use and adapt works whose copyrights have expired and are therefore in the
public domain").
166 See Copyright Holders, supra note 34, at D5 (contending that such balance coincides
with copyright investigations and precedent and clarifying that CTEA ensures that
"American authors would receive the same copyright protection in Europe as their Euro-
pean counterparts"); see also Tyler T. Ochoa, Copyright Caw: 1984 and Beyond: Two Dec-
ades of Copyright Law, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 167, 170 n.28
(finding that decision in Dastar mitigated any stringent protection of copyrights resulting
from decision in Eldred).
167 Copyright Holders, supra note 34, at D5.
18 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (citing Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 349-50 (1991) (clarifying that although Copyright laws protect expressions, others
may still exercise their First Amendment rights).
169 Beck, supra note 123, at 19 (explaining Court's correct distinction between copyright
and trademark laws. In order to identify the correct origin of a work, the Court must iden-
tify the difference between the author of a work and a person who copies it).
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manufacture and distribution of unauthorized copies. But be-
cause the work was in the public domain, no authorization was
needed."170
D. The 'Practical Problems' with a Lanham Act Right of
Attribution
Dastar's definition of "origin of goods" means that there is no
federal right of attribution for the former owner of a copyright
once that copyright expires and the formerly copyrighted work
enters the public domain. 171 The Supreme Court gives three rea-
sons in Dastar as to why there would be "serious practical prob-
lems" in "reading 'origin' in §43(a) to require attribution of un-
copyrighted materials."'172 First, the Court feels that it would not
be easy to figure out exactly who would be in this line of origin.173
The Court gives an example here about who, after copyright ex-
piration, could perhaps fit the definition of 'origin' in the film
Carmen Jones, and thus require attribution. 74 The Court's an-
swer is that attribution would have to go "not just to MGM, but
to Oscar Hammerstein II (who wrote the musical on which the
film was based), to Georges Bizet (who wrote the opera on which
the musical was based), and to Prosper Merimee (who wrote the
novel on which the opera was based)."'175 This example typifies,
says the Court, how neither Fox, nor its licensees SFM and New
Line, have attained status as the "original creator" because Time,
Inc. was the principal creator of the television series Crusade in
170 Beck, supra note 123, at 19.
171 See Ochoa, supra note 16, at 911 (emphasis added) (stating that Court in Dastar
would decide if there was federal right of attribution); see also Saunders, supra note 11, at
162 (stating that there is no "federal moral right of attribution" after previously copy-
righted work has entered public domain); Simko, supra note 121, at 357 (stating that
Court decided correctly when it held that Dastar could market Fox's series without attri-
bution to Fox).
172 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 35 (2003).
173 See Id. (stating "... the word '"origin" has no discernable limits."); see also Ronald,
supra note 26, at 252 (stating that meaning of word "origin" cannot be stretched so much
so as to include "creative imaginators of an underlying work."); Simko, supra note 121, at
358 (determining origin of goods creates likelihood of confision in consumers).
174 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 35 (explaining requiring attribution would cause issues); see
also Zyla v. Wadsworth, 360 F.3d 243, 251-52 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that Dastar was
controlling because no false designation of origin had occurred by Zyla's publisher);
Simko, supra note 121, at 361 (stating that once work has entered into public domain it is
not property of any one particular individual).
175 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 35.
ORIGIN OF GOODS
Europe.176 The Court imagines that such a broad interpretation
of the Lanham Act would require, perhaps, for the Crusade tapes
to credit even the military cameramen who took the footage.
177
The Court famously avows, "We do not think the Lanham Act re-
quires this search for the source of the Nile and all its tributar-
ies."17 8
Supporters of this 'practical problem' to an attribution right for
works with expired copyrights agree that there are no defined
limits in §43(a) as to who is the creator that should be credited. 179
Critics of this argue that the Court's Dastar ruling "throttled the
attribution rights of authors .... The decision was morally wrong
and only modestly supported .... It is too difficult, the Supreme
Court wrote, to ferret out the identity of an author. I can't imag-
ine difficulty as a bar to attribution."'80 Another critique feels
that the Court's own example of this difficulty in attribution
works against their decision: "Yet his example - that the pro-
ducer of a remake of the film Carmen Jones would have to give
credit to MGM, Oscar Hammerstein II, Georges Bizet, and Pros-
per Merimee - doesn't seem that onerous .... If this is 'mutant
copyright,' the mutation is very weak."'' Furthermore, an argu-
ment against the Court's reasoning holds that a person using the
work of another has to check to see if that work is in the public
domain so that it can be used without compensation - and since
the second creator is checking anyway, "one could argue that tak-
176 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 35-36 (noting that SFM and New line had nothing to do with
making of series, because they were merely licensees, as well as stating that "involvement
with the creation of the television series was limited at best."); see also Fries, supra note
36, at 30 (stating that broad reading of Lanham Act would require essentially everyone
involved in Fox series to be credited); Jonathan D. Reichman, Origin of Goods Under the
Lanham Act, INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST, July 11, 2003, at 1 (avowing that word "origin"
has no discernable limits).
177 See Mauro, supra note 50, at 1 (stating that overly broad interpretation of Lanham
Act could require credit to go to military cameramen who took wartime footage).
178 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 35-36 (2003).
179 See Elgin, supra note 96, at 1 (stating that broadly construing Lanham Act makes it
difficult to determine who should be credited with film or novel); Tony Mauro, No Copy-
right? No Credit, Court Rules High Court says Lanham Act-doesn't Require Copiers to Ac-
knowledge Creators of Works Now in Public Domain, LEGAL TIMES, June 9, 2003, at 12
(explaining there was doubt regarding Lanham Act meaning of copying material of public
domain).
180 Astrachan, supra note 37, at 1 (arguing that compliance with health care privacy or
environmental laws may not be simple task). See Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 268 (imply-
ing that phrase "origin" would still apply to authors of idea, concept or communication
embodied in good); see also Saunders, supra note 11, at 177 (arguing that owners of works
have tried to persuade Congress to extend intellectual property protection).
181 Fries, supra note 36, at 30.
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ing the time to give attribution to known author of the works is
not unduly burdensome."' 18 2
The Court's second 'practical problem' to an attribution right
for communicative products with expired copyrights is that such
a right would place manufacturers in a no-win situation.183 These
manufacturers could potentially face Lanham Act liability, de-
pending on the Court's definition of the phrase "origin of goods,"
for either failing to credit original creators or for crediting such a
creator in a way that implies sponsorship or approval of the new
copy.184 Supporters feel that, "It is difficult to imagine how such a
notice could be given without confusing the public in some man-
ner. In order to avoid such a result, the Lanham Act should be
interpreted to permit the free use of materials in the public do-
main, without any duty to identify the former owner of the ex-
pired copyright."18 5 Critics argue this could be easily overcome
with a "disclaimer of such sponsorship or approval, such as 'the
contribution of the following authors or filmmakers whose copy-
rights have expired is acknowledged, though none of them have
sponsored or approved of this version.' Further, the.. .originators
may approve, if asked."'8 6
The Supreme Court's third 'practical problem' with requiring
an attribution right for works with expired copyrights is that,
"reading §43(a) of the Lanham Act as creating a cause of ac-
tion for, in effect, plagiarism-the use of otherwise unprotected
works and inventions without attribution-would be hard to rec-
oncile with our previous decisions."'8 7 Supporters agree that the
Dastar decision is consistent with recent decisions in its refusal
182 Susser, supra note 5, at 13 (noting that it is not particularly difficult to give everyone
in chain of title of creativity line in small print, because "motion pictures, as a rule, give
credit to far less important contributors in their lengthy credits, such as caterers on the
set").
183 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 35 (2003) (commenting that
without copyrighted work as base point requiring attribution to uncopyrighted materials
would pose practical problems); see also Law Professors, supra note 94, at 944 (arguing
that interpreting that Lanham Act requires that the publisher or a revised work credit
the former publisher or distributor of a work in the public domain would place the pub-
lisher in a no-win situation). See generally Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 323,
338 (1979) (discussing the unfairness of a "heads I win, tails you lose" form of litigation.).
iS4 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2004) (stating that it is forbidden for person to use
"any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof' that is likely to
cause mistake as to origin of his or her goods); see also Dastar, 539 U.S. at 36 (explaining
this practical problem).
185 Law Professors, supra note 94, at 945.
186 Susser, supra note 5, at 13.
187 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 36 (2003).
2005] ORIGIN OF GOODS
to extend the Lanham Act to conflict with copyright law. 188 A cri-
tique is that the cases the Court cites as its "previous deci-
sions"'8 9 can be distinguished from the facts of Dastar, even
though the Court argued that a broader interpretation of the
phrase "origin of goods" would be inconsistent with precedent. 190
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers Inc.,191 TrafFix De-
vices Inc. v. Marketing Displays Inc.,192 and Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats Inc.,193 the plaintiffs were not seeking mere
attribution; instead, the plaintiffs had claims "for damages and
an injunction against manufacture and sale of the perceived
knock-off under any circumstances."' 94 Other critics argue that
"copying substantially all of a work of authorship ('wholesale re-
liance') without giving intellectual content credit - may be just a
fancy way of saying plagiarism is not illegal."'195
E. Consumers' Thoughts about Origin
In a reason related to the history and purpose of the Lanham
Act, as well as to the "practical problems" associated with attri-
bution, Dastar also gives a narrow definition to the §43(a) phrase
"origin of goods" because of the Court's perception of customers in
the marketplace. 196 One function of the Lanham Act is to prevent
188 See Susser, supra note 5, at 13 (noting that court felt Lanham Act should not be
broadly construed if consumer did not care who created product in intellectual content
sense). See generally McLain, supra note 11, at 187 (discussing Court's recognition of im-
portance of public domain in Dastar); Saunders, supra note 11, at 175-76 (highlighting
divergence of Court's decision to uphold extension of copyright terms in Eldred and its
rejection of Lanham Act in Dastar, which gave more power to subsequent users of copy-
righted works).189 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 36.
19o See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31-33 (stating desire to define origin of goods as excluding
Fox because such finding would be inconsistent with precedent, as well as stretch text of
Lanham Act). See generally Beck, supra note 123, at 19 (explaining that precedent has
established that copyrights are granted for limited terms in order to promote creation of
new works that will one day enter public domain); Susser, supra note 5, at 13 (noting dif-
ference between copying and "making exact duplicate.").
191 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (discussing knock-offs of children's clothes).
192 532 U.S 23 (2001) (highlighting that functional features are not subject to trade
dress protection).
193 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (regarding non-patented boat hulls).
194 Susser, supra note 5, at 13 (extrapolating difference between copying "the work of
another as a new tangible product (such as a piece of clothing) versus [making] type of
exact duplicate possible with sound recordings, photographs or film footage. The first type
of copy is based on the former work, while the second type is the former work").
195 Id. (citing Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 36 (2003)).
196 See Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 31-32 (2003) (restricting definition of "origin of goods"
as "the producer of the tangible product sold in the marketplace); see also Graeme W.
Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 832 (2004)
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deception of consumers interested in the identity of the creator or
the identity of a physical product's manufacturer. 197 The Court
notes that §43(a) disallows measures that mislead consumers
and harm a producer's goodwill. 198
The Court uses an example' 99 in order to clarify the desires of
consumers in the, modern marketplace: when a consumer pur-
chases a soft drink like Pepsi, that consumer does not necessarily
presume that Pepsi itself created the original idea for a soft
drink as a product or that Pepsi was the first to invent a scien-
tific soft drink formula.200 The Court's cursory summation is that
consumers of such branded products "typically [do] not care"
whether the brand-name company selling the product (the soda,
for example) is "the same entity that came up with the idea for
the product, or designed the product."20 1 Basically, the consumer
does not care who came up with the soda, as long as they get soda
(proposing that Dastar decision was based on Court's assumptions of consumer thought
processes); Laurence P. Colton, 2003 Eleventh Circuit Survey: Intellectual Property, 55
MERCER L. REV. 1327, 1348-49 (2004) (explaining Dastar limitation of phrase "origin of
goods").
197 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 32 (holding that "Section 43(a) of the Lantham Act prohibits
actions like trademark infringement that deceives consumers and impairs a producer's
goodwill"); see also Mark A. Kahn, May the Best Merchandise Win: The Law of Non-
Trademark Uses of Sports Logos, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 283, 286 (2004) (stating pur-
pose of Lantham Act was preventing use of misleading and deceptive marks which con-
fuse customer). See generally Scott Harvison, Two Wrongs Making a Right: Using the
Third and Ninth For a Uniform Standard of Fame in Federal Dilution Law, 25 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 867, 869 (2002) (citing protection of customers' interests in identity of their
purchase as one of two functions of Lantham Act).
198 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 32 (stating one example as trademark infringement); see also
Timothy R.M. Bryant, Trademark Infringement: The Irrelevance of Evidence of Copying to
Secondary Meaning, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 473, 482 (1988) (announcing Congress' purpose in
§ 43(a) of Lantham Act as protecting producer's goodwill and as protecting against decep-
tion of consumers); John D. Marans, Westchester Media Co. L.P., et al. v. PRL USA Hold-
ings, Inc.: The Fight Over the Name, "Polo," 8 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 351, 356 (2002)
(explaining that Lantham Act prevents consumers from being mislead by confusing
trademark and protects manufacturer's right to identify and distinguish his or her goods).
199 See Dastar, 539 U.S, at 32 (clarifying that Lanham Act would indeed outlaw "the
Coca-Cola Company's passing off its product as Pepsi-Cola or reverse passing off Pepsi-
Cola as its product"); see also Austin, supra note 196, at 876 (agreeing that §43(a) of Lan-
tham Act forbids Coca-Cola or Pepsi-Cola from misrepresenting their product as other
company's); Ronald, supra note 26, at 244 (explaining reverse passing off using same
Pepsi and Coca-Cola example).
200 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 32 (2003) (postulating that
consumers of brand-name products like Coke or Pepsi "believes that that company pro-
duced (or at least stands behind the production of) that product, surely does not necessar-
ily believe that that company was the "origin" of the drink in the sense that it was the
very first to devise the formula"); see also Robert P. Andris & Elise R. Vasquez, Supreme
Court Clarifies the Meaning of "Origin of Goods" in Trademark Law, 15 No. 11 J.
PROPRIETARY RTS. 6, 7 (2003) (concluding that brand-loyal cola consumer do not care if
company was origin of formula). See generally Gasaway, supra note 7, at 7 (stating pro-
ducers of goods, and not authors of ideas, were identification aim of Lanham Act).
201 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 32 (emphasis added).
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from the expected manufacturer or source. Deciding that the ini-
tial origin of the product is usually and predictably of no impor-
tance to consumers leads the Court to preclude original creators
in their narrow definition of "origin of goods" under §43(a) of the
Lanham Act.20 2 This seems to conflict with some Circuit history:
in 1974, "Congress' purpose in enacting §43(a) of the Lanham
Act is to create a special and limited unfair competition remedy,
virtually without regard for the interests of consumers generally
and almost certainly without any consideration of consumer
rights of action in particular. '20 3
V. THE LEGACY OF DASTAR
A. Rejection of a §43(a) Right to Attribution
The Court holds that the phrase "origin of goods" in the
Lanham Act cannot include attributing the entity that originated
the ideas embodied in goods - effectively holding that once a
copyright expires, the public should not be impeded from access-
ing the work, in such a way as commanding the Lanham Act to
require such attribution to the original creator.204 This begs crit-
icizers of the court's attribution arguments to ask, "Why not bal-
ance the rights of authors and the public? Why not use the
Lanham Act to provide the attribution an author demands and
the public is entitled to? Why allow a subsequent author to trade
on the value of an earlier work without acknowledgement? Why
should consumers not know the 'origin' of the work?"20 5 Is it more
ethical to hold the opposite of the Dastar holding - that the en-
202 See Id. (postulating that the Lanham Act should not be stretched to cover matter of
no usual importance to purchasers); see also Susser, supra note 5, at 13 (observing that
court felt Lanham Act should not be broadly construed if consumer did not care who cre-
ated product in intellectual content sense).
203 Alfed Dunhill, Ltd. V. Interstate Cigar Co., 499 F.2d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1974) (empha-
sis added).
204 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33 (explaining Lanham Act "should not be stretched to cover
matters that are typically of no consequence to purchasers); see also Astrachan, supra
note 37, at 1 (noting that, according to Supreme Court, requiring attribution of original
author of uncopyrighted work is impediment to public's access of that work); Garrett, su-
pra note 23, at 580 (concluding that Court in Dastar established bright-line rule requiring
proper attribution only for use of works outside of public domain); Saunders, supra note
11, at 162 (observing that, according to Dastar, there is no federal moral right of attribu-
tion that exists after work has entered public domain).
205 Astrachan, supra note 37, at 1.
20051
454 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 19:2
tity using a work in the public domain should be required to cite
to the original author?206
1. Communicative Products
While a can of Pepsi and a videotape are both simply items
floating around in the stream of commerce, created by someone
and then sold by someone else, a branded product like a soda is
arguably fundamentally different from a communicative product
- which has significance due to the intellectual content conveyed
as opposed to physical function.20 7 Looking at novels, for example,
the Court admits consumers buy books with an eye towards the
author, not because of the publisher. 208 Interestingly, "this, of
course, is what Fox argued."20 9 Although acknowledging that
purchaser concern might differ between a soda and a videotape,
the Court declined to adopt a different attribution standard for
communicative products. 210 Historically, the Court's alignment of
'origin' with producer of the wares in the stream of commerce is
correct: the Lanham Act originally "was aimed at identifying the
206 See id. (finding decision to allow copy of work without attribution of original author
morally wrong); see also Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 263 (interpreting author attribution
as moral right that should be incorporated in U.S. Copyright Act); Gasaway, supra note
12, at 7 (affirming that it would be more ethical "especially in.. .serious... scholarship
where it would be unconscionable to publish such work without crediting earlier work
from public domain").
207 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003) (describing books
or videos, not hammers, as communicative products); see also Astrachan, supra note 37, at
1 (noting that works of authorship are different from consumer appliances, since the con-
sumer is interested in author of book but not engineer of product); Goforth, supra note 33,
at 337-38 (reiterating Supreme Court's argument that although purchaser concern for
communicative products may be different, Lanham Act should not apply).
208 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33 (stating that purchaser of a novel is interested first and
foremost in originator of story conveyed in that book); see also id. at 2048 (noting that ex-
tending term 'origin' would force statute to "include not merely the producer of the physi-
cal item (the publishing house Farrar, Straus and Giroux, or the video producer Dastar)
but also the creator of the content that the physical item conveys"); Garrett, supra note
23, at 579 (agreeing with court's reasoning that consumer of communicative product is
more interested in creator of product than its manufacturer); Elgin, supra note 96, at 1
(noting that purchasers probably care more about author of communicative product than
publisher).
209 Supreme Court Rules that Distributor of Video of Edited Version of Public Domain
Television Series Did Not Violate Lanham Act by Failing to Credit Twentieth Century Fox
as Series' Creator, ENT. L. REP., June, 2003, at 1 (presenting Fox's argument to require
author attribution); see also Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31 (addressing defendant's argument that
consumer is interested in author of communicative product, but refusing to require author
attribution for uncopyrighted work).
210 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33 (concluding copyright law and Lanham Act would conflict
if special treatment was given to communicative products); see also Elgin, supra note 96,
at 1 (stating ideas, concepts, and communications of goods are not covered under Lanham
Act); Greenhouse, supra note 15, at 26 (defining 'tangible good' under Court's analysis as
referring to counterfeit watch, for example, but not communicative products).
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producer of the goods that are offered for sale, not the author of
any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods."21'
The author of a communicative product also has an interest in
avoiding reverse passing off under the Lanham Act, yet the Court
rejects expansion of "origin of goods" to include them.212 How-
ever, Dastar critics claim that an argument for attribution rights
is much stronger for a communicative product than for a hammer
or a soda can.213 "Origin means the producer of the products.
And that's the rub. Works of authorship are different from lawn
mowers and food processors. Consumers buy appliances without
regard to the identity of the engineer who designed them. The
buy decision is different for authors and writers."21 4 Most people
would prefer to know the author of intellectual property, like a
book author.215 The 'origin' of a book - one author who thinks up
the ideas contained - is peculiarly different from the 'origin' of a
soda's scientific formula. 216 On one hand, Dastar's Campaigns
tapes are simply "edited material no longer under copyright from
someone else's production."217 On the other hand, the tapes can
be seen as a communicative product, deserving of - and not re-
ceiving - attribution.
211 Gasaway, supra note 7, at 7 (stating producers of goods, and not authors of ideas,
were identification aim of Lanham Act).
212 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 32 (commenting reverse passing off is likely to deceive con-
sumers); see also Richeson, supra note 11, at 218 (stating inclusion of communicative
products under Lanham Act would result in conflict with copyright law); Susser, supra
note 5, at 14 (noting word 'origin' does not include authors of intellectual content).
213 See Astrachan, supra note 37, at 1 (arguing that people take notice of creators and
authorship); see also Fries, supra note 36, at 30 (commenting people are concerned with
creators of copyrightable works); McLain, supra note 11, at 80 (highlighting copyrightable
works are subject to reverse passing off).
214 Astrachan, supra note 37, at 1.
215 See Astrachan, supra note 37, at 1 (arguing that people are concerned more about
author of book than its publisher); see also Fries, supra note 36, at 30 (stating that, "In all
probability, some consumers don't care about the source of noncopyrightable subject mat-
ter, such as data.... Most of us want to know who wrote the book or took the photo");
Susser, supra note 5, at 15 (commenting purchaser is likely to be interested in author of
copyrightable work).
216 See Astrachan, supra note 37, at 1 (arguing that people notice creators and authors);
see also Fries, supra note 36, at 30 (noting that most people do not take interest in creator
of public information but do notice creators of works of art); Susser, supra note 5, at 13
(noting communicative products have 'particular' origin in "sense of original creator or
author");
217 Frank J. Murray, Justices Refuse to Hear Veterans' Benefits Case; Promise of Free
Medical Care Broken, WASH. TIMES, June 3, 2003, at A01 (stating attribution is not re-
quired for uncopyrighted material).
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2. VARA, Berne, and the Moral Rights Doctrine
The Dastar decision, while expressly showing that §43(a) of the
Lanham Act provides no right of attribution,218 seems to high-
light the virtue of the express right of attribution contained in
the Visual Artists' Rights Act [VARA] of 1990.219 The right of at-
tribution - part of the moral rights doctrine - is the right to be
recognized as an author of a work. 220 VARA's express right of at-
tribution states that "the author of a work of visual art... shall
have the right... to claim authorship of that work. ' 221 The Dastar
court noted that "recognizing in §43(a) a cause of action for mis-
representation of authorship of noncopyrighted works (visual or
otherwise) would render these limitations [in VARA] superfluous.
A statutory interpretation that renders another statute superflu-
ous is of course to be avoided."222 The Court further comments
that VARA is an example of Congress explicitly expanding intel-
lectual property protections. 223 Supporters agree: users of public
domain works should not have to worry about being sued from
218 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003) (explaining rights
to copy without attribution passes to public once copyright expires); see also Fries, supra
note 36, at 30 (stating attribution is not required when copyright terminates); Ginsburg,
supra note 12, at 269 (stating that uncopyrighted works do not require attribution).
219 17 U.S.C. § 106(A) (2004) (stating that "the author of a work of visual art shall have
the right to claim authorship of that work").
220 See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995) (specifying that
right of attribution entitles recognition of an artist "by name as the author of his work or
to publish anonymously or pseudonymously, the right to prevent the author's work from
being attributed to someone else, and to prevent the use of the author's name on works
created by others, including distorted editions of the author's original work"); see also
English v. BFC&R E. i1TH St. LLC, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19137, at * 7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
2, 1997) (pointing out that right to attribution allows artist to be known as author of his
work), affd, No. 98-7032(L), 98-7238, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23697 (2d. Cir. NY. Sept. 27,
1999); Benjamin S. Hayes, Note, Integrating Moral Rights into U.S. Law and the Problem
of the Works for Hire Doctrine, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013, 1019 (2000) (noting conflict between
right of attribution and American work for hire doctrine, in which commissioner of work
receives credit for that work).
221 17 U.S.C. §106(A) (2004) (delineating rights of authors of visual works, who also
have right, under § 106, to "prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of
visual art which he or she did not create").
222 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34-35 (arguing that VARA was created with great deal of speci-
ficity in order to limit its reach to certain group of artists and interpretation such as this
would undermine intentions of Congress).
223 See id. at 34 (emphasizing that, unlike Lanham Act, VARA is specific and provides
"carefully limited and focused" right of attribution); see also Greenhouse, supra note 15, at
26 (asserting that Congress clearly fashioned new rights for visual artists by passing
VARA); Ochoa, supra note 16, at. 926 (declaring that VARA provides rights to distinct
class of artists).
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former copyright owners (whose copyrights have expired) for
misattribution.224
Critics of this part of Dastar scream that "one man's superflu-
ous statutory provision is another man's multiple remedy. Ex-
tending §43(a) to non-attribution surely does not conflict with the
Visual Artists Rights Act." 225 In the same vein, some feel that
VARA "provides relatively limited rights of attribution and integ-
rity for certain visual artists."226 VARA does not protect all art-
ists or everything called 'art,'227 but rather shelters only a nar-
rowly defined class of visual art. 228 Few American artists have
actually brought claims under VARA. 229 VARA also only grants
224 See Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945) (stating that, un-
der patent law, "not only is the invention of a patent dedicated to the public upon its expi-
ration, but the public thereby becomes entitled to share in the good will which the pat-
entee has built up in the patented article or product through the enjoyment of his patent
monopoly"); see also John T. Cross, Giving Credit Where Credit Is Due: Revisiting the Doc-
trine of Reverse Passing Off in Trademark Law, 72 WASH. L. REV. 709, 766 (1997) (an-
nouncing that once copyright laws give someone right to copy work of art, he is permitted
to receive credit for copies); Ochoa, supra note 16, at 923 (explaining that once work of art
enters public domain, previous copyright owners no longer have exclusive right to it and
anyone is free to copy work of art without incurring liability).
225 Susser, supra note 5, at 13 (emphasis added) (claiming that VARA is not harmed by
§ 43 (a) for variety of reasons, including fact that plaintiff has higher burden of proof
when asserting cause of action under § 43 (a)).
226 Rosenthal Kwall, supra note 9, at 30 (commenting that VARA's limited scope "not
only privileges the voices of powerful industries over those of authors, but also privileges
the voices of certain authors over others").
227 See Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that VARA only pro-
tects artists that craft "works of visual art," works of "recognized stature," or works of art
that could not be altered without damage to the artist's "honor or reputation"); see also
Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 982 F. Supp. 625, 631 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (holding that since
plaintiffs sculpture, Symphony #1", was well known and won many awards, it was work
of "recognized stature"), affd, 192 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 1999); Scott v. Dixon, 309 F. Supp. 2d
395, 397-98, 400 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (concluding that plaintiffs sculpture was not work of
"recognized stature" because it remained in defendant's backyard, away from public's
view).
228 See Pollara, 344 F.3d at 269 (stating that not only must art fit narrow definition of
"visual art" but art must also be "of recognized stature"); see also Carter v. Helmsley-
Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 1995) (describing 'visual art' under VARA as including
"paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures, or photographs produced for exhibition purposes,
existing in a single copy or limited edition of 200 copies or fewer"); Monica E. Antezana,
The European Union Internet Copyright Directive as Even more than It Envisions: Toward
a Supra-EU Harmonization of Copyright Policy and Theory, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
415, 430 (2003) (viewing VARA's definition of visual art as narrow).
229 See Christopher J. Robinson, The "Recognized Stature" Standard in the Visual Art-
ists Rights Act, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1935, 1948 (2000) (stating that "application of VARA
and the related state statutes is limited to a mere handful of cases"); see also Leigh Jones,
Artistic Stature; Sculptor Loses Bid to Protect Work Under Federal Law, 65 N.Y. L.J. 16
(2004) (reporting that few cases have dealt with VARA); Geri J. Yonover, Artistic Parody:
The Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair Use, 14 CARIDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 79, 82 (1996) (observing that "many artists vigorously exercise their moral rights (of
attribution) in such countries as France, Italy, Germany and Canada").
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attribution rights to works created on or after June 1, 1991.230
The Court does not seem to take into account the connection be-
tween VARA and films - like the disputed Crusade and Cam-
paigns here. The definition of 'visual art' under VARA specifi-
cally excludes motion pictures and audio-visual media, 231 and
thus would not even cover Dastar's films. Interestingly, VARA
was originally limited, in part, in response to the motion picture
industry itself, which was concerned with the effect of the moral
rights doctrine in America. 232
Also, finding a right of attribution under §43(a) "would still al-
low copying in any medium without obtaining a license or other
authorization. And the author would still have no control over
how, when, where, why, or for whom copies were produced. The
only requirement would be to acknowledge authorship. '' 233 In-
deed, one possible solution to avoid consumer confusion as to the
origin of a product would be to label a work taken from the public
domain with its own name, 234 or the name of its author. It is ba-
sic human nature - people normally crave credit for their
work. 235 'Moral rights are legal rights that recognize an artist's
230 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2004) (defining section to be effective 6 months after date of
enactment); see also Bd. of Managers of Soho Int'l Arts Condo. v. City of New York, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10221, *28 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that "as VARA was enacted
into law on December 1, 1990, the effective date is June 1, 1991."); Carter, 71 F.3d at 83
(clarifying that such rights last for length of author's life, for individual author).
231 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004) (defining audio-visual works as outside scope of statute);
see also Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212, 1219 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) (excluding mo-
tion pictures and audio-visual works from scope of VARA); Carter, 71 F.3d at 84 (stating
that motion picture and audio-visual works are not covered by VARA).
232 See David A. Honicky, Film Labelling as a Cure for Colorization [and other Altera-
tions]: A Band-Aid for a Hatchet Job, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 409, 430 (1994) (dis-
tinguishing opposing motives in film industry of creators who wish to preserve film as
created as to motives of studios who often desire to alter film for economic gain); see also
Rosenthal Kwall, supra note 9, at 28 (emphasizing need of "film producers [to] have unen-
cumbered freedom to adapt their productions to differing needs of various markets"); Jen-
nifer T. Olsson, Rights in Fine Art Photography: Through a Lens Darkly, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1489, 1513 (1992) (postulating that film industry's objections to moral rights doctrine
stem from economic motives of non-artists).
233 Fries, supra note 36, at 30.
234 See Maljack Prods. v. Goodtimes Home Video Corp., 81 F.3d 881, 887 (9th Cir. 1996)
(citing and agreeing with Leslie A. Kurtz, Protection for Titles of Literary Works in the
Public Domain, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 53, 77 (1984), wherein she wrote that there is little
likelihood that public will become confused if and when public domain work retains its
original name); see also Law Professors, supra note 94, at 940-41 (summarizing case law
and determining that work in public domain may be reproduced with same name without
consumer confusion); Simko, supra note 121, at 368 (determining that "more recent cases
suggest that subsequent purchaser must only label public domain work with its own
name").
235 See Rosenthal Kwall, supra note 9, at 985 (stating that "people typically desire rec-
ognition for their accomplishments"); see also Susan P. Liemer, Understanding Artists'
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noneconomic interest in his work .... The moral right of attribu-
tion recognizes that the artist has suffered a noneconomic injury
when his name is not attached to one of his works."236 Without
moral rights, the American copyright system can be considered
amoral.237 The effect of Dastar, ultimately, is to remove an ave-
nue to sue for attribution - and thus contrast to the moral rights
ideology.
Moral rights have met staunch opposition. Opponents deem
the moral rights dogma as contradictory to the traditional Ameri-
can copyright system, which views copyright as an economic in-
centive to create238 and which holds as a fundamental principle
that copyrights are a monopoly for a limited time. 239 Initial at-
tempts in Congress to impose moral rights failed, until Congress
passed the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988.240
VARA, enacted as an amendment to the Copyright Act to incor-
Moral Rights: A Primer, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 41, 49 (1998) (stating that artists' works are
extension of themselves and thus artists desire recognition for their work); Neil Netanel,
Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and
Continental Copyrightlaw, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 34 (1994) (likening relation-
ship of artists' work to "sacrosanct" "natural link" between father and his child).
236 Vander Voort, supra note 13, at 1586.
237 See Rosenthal Kwall, supra note 9, at 27 (arguing that the absence of substantive
federal protections for the moral rights of the artistic creator of intellectual property cre-
ate an "amoral" copyright system, which favors the economic interests of the property
owner over the non-economic interests of the creator of the property); see also Roberta
Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38
VAND. L. REV. 1, 28, 29 (1985) (contending that the lack of federal legislation protecting
the moral rights of creators creates an imbalance amongst competing interests in intellec-
tual property).
238 See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431, 432
(1984) (stating that opponents of Berne in the United States believe that granting authors
moral rights will impair these traditional economic incentives, and have a negative im-
pact on editorial practices in the media); see also Arthur B. Sackler, The United States
Should Not Adhere to the Berne Copyright Convention, 3 J.L. & TECH. 207, 207 (1988);
Russ VerSteeg, Federal Moral Rights for Visual Artists: Contract Theory and Analysis, 67
WASH. L. REV. 827, 830 (1992) (noting that opponents of the Berne Convention Implemen-
tation Act believed that the adoption of moral rights would "impede the production and
distribution of copyrighted works").
239 See Packard, supra note 80, at 8 (commenting that American copyright system has
traditionally viewed copyrights as limited monopoly for copyright holder, rather than
natural property right); see also Note, Visual Artists'Rights in a Digital Age, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1977, 1984 (1994) (noting that "[tihe American copyright system assumes that artists
will produce creative works only if given incentive of limited monopoly").
240 See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. 71 F.3d 77, 82, 83 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that bills
introduced by Congress to protect artists' rights had drawn little support until adoption of
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988); see also 9 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.06 fn 2 (Nellie Howard et al. eds., Release No. 64,
2004) (commenting that "Congressional proposals to implement artists' rights dates back
to 1979"); Gerald Dworkin, The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Common
Law Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 229, 259 (1995) (noting that attempts have
been made over last twenty years to enact moral rights legislation that have failed until
adoption of Berne Convention and Visual Artist's Rights Act).
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porate the moral rights doctrine, 241 is "analogous to Article 6bis
of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artis-
tic Works, but its coverage is more limited. ' 242 The Berne Con-
vention and VARA have forced the issue of how to deal with
moral rights.243 However, "as a signatory to the Berne Conven-
tion, the United States is obligated to protect authors' moral
rights (something U.S. copyright law has traditionally not done),
but has skirted the issue by concluding that current domestic
laws, such as unfair competition, defamation, privacy and con-
tract law, adequately protect author's work."244
In truth, the Dastar decision "raises the question of whether
the U.S. is now in default of its obligations under Berne" because
the United States used §43(a) as an example when it joined
Berne to show that its law did indeed protect moral rights. 245 In-
deed, a few years ago, serious discussions were "given to the idea
that authors' moral rights were protected... under legal schemes
other than copyright. Chief among these, it was argued, was
§43(a) .... [VARA's] narrow protection of moral rights was toler-
ated because other protections were supposedly available, includ-
241 See Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that VARA was en-
acted by Congress as amendment to Copyright Act to protect moral rights of some artists);
see also Cort v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Companies. Inc., 311 F.3d 979, 984-85 (9th
Cir. 2002) (noting that VARA protects moral rights of "integrity" and "attribution" to par-
tially implement moral rights provision of Berne Convention); Carter v. Helmsley-Spear,
Inc. 71 F.3d at 83 (stating that VARA granted rights of attribution to certain class of art-
ists).
242 Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'Anza Research International, Inc., 523 U.S. 135,
149 n.21 (1998). See 17 U.S.C. §106A (granting author of work rights of attribution and
integrity); The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art.6
bis, 1 B.D.I.E.L 715 (2004) (guarantees author of work rights of attribution and integrity).
243 See Hayes, supra note 220, at 1013 (arguing that recognition of moral rights for au-
thor under Berne and VARA have forced issue of "[h]ow to cope with moral rights"); see
also Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal System
of Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U.L. REV. 945, 948 (1990) (suggesting
that VARA, as federal legislation that only addresses moral rights of visual artists, repre-
sents incremental approach that will foster further legislation about moral rights); Pat-
rick G. Zabatta, Moral and Musical Works: Are Composers Getting Berned?, 43 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 1095, 1129 (1992) (contending that recognition of moral rights for author under
Berne and VARA have created obligation for Congress to address moral rights for non-
visual artists).
244 Packard, supra note 80, at 8 (emphasis added).
245 See Supreme Court Rules that Distributor of Video of Edited Version of Public Do-
main Television Series Did Not Violate Lanham Act by Failing to Credit Twentieth Cen-
tury Fox as Series' Creator, ENT. L. REP., June, 2003, at 1 (suggesting that United States
may be in violation of the Berne Convention following Dastar decision, although there are
no enforceable remedies against member nations who violate the convention. Article
6bis(3) of Convention states that any relief to enforce the moral rights of an author should
be governed by legislation of nation that claim comes from, and creates no remedy of its
own).
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ing state laws against misappropriation and, of course, §43(a). 246
Dastar's critics show surprise that, after Dastar, the Lanham Act
does not protect attribution -thus lacking moral rights protection
- and rights of attribution are not available under other legal
avenues since VARA's passing.247 The consequences are dire: "If
the publisher of Mr. Darcy's Daughters, a sequel to Pride and
Prejudice by modern author Elizabeth Aston, sold a boxed set of
the sequel and the original, apparently it could omit any mention
of Jane Austen. But could it actually claim authorship of Pride
and Prejudice for Ms. Aston?"248 As a result, in light of copyright
law's focus on the protection of author's pecuniary interests and
failure to preserve attribution, some Dastar opponents call for a
solution: an independent right of attribution. 249
B. Dastar's Legacy in the Courtroom
Thus far, how have subsequent lower courts interpreted the
Dastar holding? Many cases affected by Dastar involve a failure
to give credit to authors who helped create part of a work. In
Williams v. UMG Recordings,250 the 'materially identical' (to the
facts of Dastar) §43(a) reverse passing off claim of a film narrator
and director was barred as a matter of law, based on Dastar's
definition of the 'origin of goods.' 251 The Williams court held that
such failure to credit is not actionable under the Lanham Act af-
ter Dastar.252 In addition, the Ninth Circuit affirmed that Dastar
is "not a broad sweeping dismissal of reverse passing off claims
246 Fries, supra note 36, at 30.
247 See id. (noting that, after Dastar and VARA, attribution rights are not available un-
der other legal schemes); see also Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 282 (arguing that Dastar
Court's reading of VARA provides fewer attribution rights after VARA than before
VARA); Astrachan, supra note 37, at 1 (stating that Court's decision in Dastar throttled
attribution rights).
248 Fries, supra note 36, at 30.
249 See Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 286 (stating that amendment to U.S. Copyright Act
specifically providing attribution rights is necessary to afford meaningful rights to au-
thors); see also Rosenthal Kwall, supra note 9, at 1020 (arguing that plaintiffs are forced
to rely on Lantham Act to remedy violation of their attribution rights, but such remedy
could only be provided within scope of independent right of attribution); Saunders, supra
note 11, at 178 (noting that attribution rights will not exist unless expressly created by
Congress).
250 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (discussing director's claim that failure
of defendants to include his name in film that he contributed to violated Lanham Act).
251 Id. at 1181-84 (citing Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 38 (2003)).
252 See Williams, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 1181 (discussing director's claim that failure of de-
fendants to include his name in film he contributed to violated Lanham Act).
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and is limited to defining 'origin of goods.' 253 The Williams deci-
sion blatantly notes that Dastar's holding shows that a "defen-
dant's failure to credit.. .is actionable only where the defendant
literally repackages the plaintiffs goods and sells them as the de-
fendant's own - not where, as here, Defendants are accused only
of failing to identify someone who contributed not goods, but
ideas... to Defendants' product. '254 Similarly, the Second Cir-
cuit's Caroll v. Kahn255 decision sums up these Lanham Act false
designation of origin claims regarding failure to credit: "A
Lanham Act claim based on Defendants' alleged failure to give
Plaintiff proper credit as author and/or producer, however, is
foreclosed by Dastar.''256 This even ultimately affected the end of
the Crusades in Europe case: in Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp. v. Dastar Corp.,25 7 the Ninth Circuit had to reconsider the
plaintiff Fox's unfair competition claim in light of the Supreme
Court's 'refining' the definition of the term "origin of goods."258
Because the Court's defining 'origin' "impliedly rejected any con-
sumer confusion regarding Defendants' product," 259 the defen-
dant (Dastar Corp.) was the origin. 260 There was no false desig-
nation of origin, and, thus, no consumer confusion.261 The Ninth
253 Williams, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 1183.
254 Williams v. UMG Recordings, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1,177, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
255 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17902, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2003) (discussing plaintiffs
claim as alleging that defendants used his storyline and treatment for film, and then
failed to credit him as film's producer and author).
256Id. at *15. See Bretford Mfg. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Co., 286 F. Supp. 2d 969, 972 (N.D.
Ill. 2003) (holding that there is no misrepresentation in false designation 'reverse passing
off claim because, after Dastar, court interprets the Lanham Act as being concerned with
completed tangible product in marketplace); see also Larkin Group, Inc. v. Aquatic Design
Consultants, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1126-27 (E.D. Va. 2004) (holding that Lanham
Act claim based on use of another's ideas in business proposal without attribution of
credit is foreclosed by Dastar); Tao of Systems Integration, Inc. v. Analytical Serv.'s &
Materials, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 565, 572 (E.D. Va. 2004) (explaining that elimination of
Lanham Act claim for use of another's ideas in business proposal is type of action in-
tended by Court to be precluded by Dastar).
257 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21194, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2003).
258 Id. at *6-7 (announcing that Court's decision to define "origin of goods" changed
law).
259 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21194, at *8.
260 See id. at *8 (explaining how Court's definition of 'origin' rejects the possibility of
consumer confusion); see also Larkin Group, Inc. v. Aquatic Design Consultants, Inc., 323
F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1124-27 (E.D. Va. 2004) (explaining that under Dastar 'origin' of final
product is producer of it, not simply someone who contributed to it); Tao of Systems Inte-
gration, Inc. v. Analytical Services & Materials, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 565, 572 (E.D. Va.
2004) (noting that contributor of ideas to final business proposal is not 'origin' of final
business proposal under Dastar).
261 See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21194, at *8 (noting
that definition of 'origin of goods' in Dastar rejects possible consumer confusion regarding
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Circuit holds that, correspondingly, the defendant Dastar caused
no consumer confusion under the congruent California unfair
competition claim.262
In the First Circuit's Zyla v. Wadsworth26 3 decision, another
Lanham Act claim was barred due to Dastar.264 A professor sued
under §43(a) of the Lanham Act because her work had been used
in the fourth edition of a textbook without her permission or ap-
propriate attribution.265 The First Circuit states, "[t]he Supreme
Court has determined, however, that §43(a)(1)(A) does not apply
to the type of claim that [the plaintiff] raises .... [c]laims of false
authorship should be pursued under copyright law instead of un-
der the Lanham Act."266 In Boston Int'l Music, Inc. v. Austin,267
also in the First Circuit, the Supreme Court's "origin of goods"
definition in Dastar barred the plaintiffs' false designation of ori-
gin claims in violation of §43(a) of the Lanham Act. 268 Here,
parties' works); see also Bretford Mfg. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Co., 286 F. Supp. 2d 969, 971-72
(N.D. Ill. 2003) (explaining that origin of table was its producer and not producer of legs
used to construct it); Williams v. UMG Recordings, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1183 (C.D. Ca.
2003) (concluding that Court's interpretation of 'origin of goods' in Dastar precluded
Lanham act claim by contributor of ideas to movie).
262 See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21194, at *8 (holding
that defendant's claim to be sole producer did not create consumer confusion); see also
Garrett, supra note 23, at 575-80 (explaining how there can be no consumer confusion
over origin of works in public domain); Simko, supra note 121, at 358-68 (discussing role
of consumer confusion in Lanham Act claim after Supreme Court's decision in Dastar).
263 360 F.3d 243, 251-52 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that Dastar precludes Lanham Act ac-
tion brought by author of portion of text used to construct complete textbook edition).
264 See id. at 251-52 (concluding that Dastar is controlling case for this set of facts); see
also Schiffer Publ'g, Ltd. v. Chronicle Books, LLC, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16180, at *11-
*12 (D. Pa. 2004) (citing Wadsworth for proposition that removing author's name from
work does not create valid Lantham Act claim). But see Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v.
Culbro Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4935, at *85-*86 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding valid
Lanham Act claim where plaintiff and defendant had similar marks for their brands of
cigars even though they were not competing in same country due to trade embargo).
265 See Zyla, 360 F.3d at 246 (noting that plaintiff felt this would cause confusion as to
origin of the good); see also Silverstein v. Penguin Putnam, Inc., 368 F.3d 77, 78-79 (2d
Cir. 2004) (finding that compiler of certain author's poems had no valid Lanham Act claim
against publisher that originally turned down compilation and subsequently published
their own compilation of same author's poems); Heartsprings, Inc. v. Heartspring, Inc.,
143 F.3d 550, 552 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding no likelihood of confusion between plaintiff
Heartsprings and defendant Heartspring's marks despite similarity of marks).
266 Zyla, 360 F.3d at 251-52 (citing Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 123 S. Ct.
2041, 2048-2049 (2003) (stating that, "no false designation of origin had occurred because
Dastar accurately identified itself as the manufacturer of the physical video, even if it had
not accurately credited others for the creative content of the video").
267 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16240, at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 12, 2003) (stating "no false des-
ignation of origin had occurred because Dastar accurately identified itself as the manufac-
turer of the physical video, even if it had not accurately credited others for the creative
content of the video").
268 See id. at *3-*4 (noting that their claim is "sufficiently covered by the law of Copy-
right"); see also Auscape Int'l v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15764, at
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plaintiffs claimed that defendants impermissibly copied distin-
guishing parts of their composition or stole a sample from the
sound recording into the defendants' song.269 Citing Dastar to
find no false designation of origin, the First Circuit dismisses the
plaintiffs' Lanham Act claim "because the.. .claims are suffi-
ciently covered by the law of copyright, and [we] decline to con-
strue §43(a)... to require attribution to plaintiff [for the song]
where the defendants here are the 'origin' of the product they re-
corded, produced, and sold on their own. 27°
VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, in defining "origin of goods" in §43(a) of the
Lanham Act to mean "the source of wares.. .the producer of the
tangible product sold in the marketplace,"271 - not, notably, the
initial creator of that product, the main legacy of Dastar Corp., v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.272 seems to be a negation of an
attribution right under the Lanham Act, with a focus on works
falling into the public domain upon copyright expiration. Sup-
porters of an attribution right can hope that VARA lives up to its
potential as the route to attribution for visual artists; however,
what is really the course for works that do not fit VARA's tight
specifications? Conversely, Dastar's bright side is exactly this
*41 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing Dastar for proposition that Lanham Act protects producer of
goods and not originator of goods); Eco Mfg. LLC v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11384, at **5 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (agreeing with Dastar notion that "after the patent
expires.. .the American public has the right to practice the invention").
269 See Boston Int'l Music, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16240, at *3-*4 (noting that defen-
dants did not credit plaintiff as author of work); see also DigiGAN, Inc. v. iValidate, Inc.,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1324, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2004) (referring to Dastar in patent
case to show that Lanham Act is not "a panacea for all unfair trade practices"); Butler v.
Target Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12829, at *17-*18 (D. Cal. 2004) (quoting EMI Cata-
logue P'ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos, Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 2000),
as amended) (proposing that "Concluding that a song can serve as an identifying mark of
the song itself would stretch the definition of trademark -- and the protection afforded
under § 43(a) -- too far and give trademark law a role in protecting the very essence of the
song, an unwarranted extension into an area already protected by copyright law.").
270 Boston Int7 Music, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16240, at *4 (citing Dastar, 123 S.Ct. at
2050) (highlighting that phrase 'origin of goods,' as used in §43(a) of Lanham Act 'refers to
the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the author of any
idea, concept of communication embodied in those goods').
271 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003) (emphasis
added) (noting that this is most natural interpretation of word "origin").
272 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 25 (acknowledging that defendant is not original creator of
work); see also McLain, supra note 11, at 72 (noting that Dastar has left "no right of attri-
bution to the creator of an underlying or original work when that work is in the public
domain and is copied by another").
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emphasis on the public domain's importance. With such a glob-
ally connected world, and the importance of the World Wide Web,
such a hearty and broad public domain allows for the free flow of
information - and the future of the copyright system itself. Thus,
Dastar allows that 'carefully crafted' copyright bargain to flour-
ish.

